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I. INTRODUCTION

The federal government, in two different contexts, is currently reexamining the specific procedural protections that
should be afforded welfare recipients who seek to challenge decisions of welfare agencies about their benefits. The Carter Administration and Congress are reviewing welfare hearing
procedures as part of their interest in a fundamental reform of
welfare programs.' Simultaneously, the Department of Health
and Human Services (formerly HEW)2 is considering revision
of its regulations governing welfare hearings. 3 Both reform efforts propose that welfare benefits be discontinued before a
hearing decision is rendered for recipients who challenge the
termination of their benefits on the ground that the action is inconsistent with law.4 For example, these proposals would continue benefits until after a hearing if the recipient was
challenging the agency's factual conclusion that a reportedly
absent father actually lived in the home, but would deny continued assistance if the recipient was challenging the legality of
an agency policy that irregular visits from an otherwise absent
1. See H.R. 4904, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H10284 (daily ed.
Nov. 7, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Social Welfare Reform Amendments]; H.
10950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H1081 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Better Jobs and Income Act].
2. The health and welfare responsibilities of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) have recently been assumed by the newly designated Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This Article refers
to the Department as HEW when discussing the history of its regulations.
3. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,913 (1979).
4. See Better Jobs and Income Act, supra note 1, § 2144(a) (10); HEW
Working Draft of Proposed Fair Hearing Regulations (June 7, 1979), § 13(c) (on
file with the Minnesota Law Review). The House of Representatives has already passed a bill that would discontinue assistance to recipients raising an
issue of law before they have an opportunity for a hearing. Social Welfare Reform Amendments, supra note 1, § 110(b). See text accompanying note 264
(language of the new section that would be added by the bill).
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father preclude the child's welfare eligibility.5 The drafters of
amendments to the federal statute and regulations governing
welfare hearings have assumed that the decision whether differential procedural protections may be given to recipients on
the basis of the nature of the issue raised can be made solely
as a matter of policy, free from constitutional constraints. This
Article examines the validity of that assumption and concludes
that recipients challenging the legality of welfare agency actions, like those challenging agency factual determinations, are
constitutionally entitled to continuation of their benefits until a
decision is made after a hearing.
In the landmark decision of Goldberg v. Kelly,6 the
Supreme Court held that due process requires an adequate
hearing before termination of welfare benefits. 7 The plaintiffs
in Goldberg had asserted that their terminations were based on
incorrect factual premises or misapplication of rules to the
facts of their particular cases.8 Therefore, the Court's holding
requiring prior hearings was necessarily limited to cases involving factual disputes or the application of legal standards to
particular facts. 9 The Court did not decide what procedural
protections must be afforded to welfare recipients who, although not challenging the agency's understanding of the facts,
argue that the intended termination of their welfare benefits is
based on an incorrect construction of the applicable law. This
Article addresses the issue left open in Goldberg: whether the
Constitution permits a welfare agency to terminate benefits
prior to a hearing decision if the only issue raised by the recipient is a question of law.
Part H briefly traces the historical background of the current federal regulation that gives states the discretion to terminate benefits prior to a hearing decision if the only issue raised
is a question of law. Part I discusses the results of a survey
designed to ascertain how the states have exercised this discretion. Part IV assesses the validity of the hearing regulation
5. One basis of eligibility for assistance under the program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children arises if a needy child is "deprived of parental
support or care by reason of the ...

continued absence from the home ...

of a

parent." 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1) (1976). The first issue, whether the father.is actually absent from the home, would be a question of fact. The second issue
would involve legal definition, requiring interpretation of the federal statutory
term "continued absence." Definitions and examples of categories of issues
raised at welfare hearings are included in the Appendix, p. 1178 infra.
6. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
7. Id. at 261.
8. Id. at 268. But see notes 40-41 infra and accompanying text.
9. 397 U.S. at 268 n.15. But see notes 42-43 infra and accompanying text.

1110

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64.1107

under the Social Security Act. Part V explores the current constitutional standard for the denial of prior hearings, a discussion that serves as a basis for Part VI, which presents an
empirical study of the efficacy of prior hearings on questions of
law.
IL A HISTORY OF HEW POLICY CONCERNING
WELFARE APPEALS ON QUESTIONS OF LAW
This Article focuses on hearings afforded to recipients of
benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC),10 a federal program that makes funds available to the
states to assist the families of needy children who have been
deprived of support or care by the death, incapacity, or continued absence from the home of a parent."
In order to comprehend the role of welfare hearings, it is
useful to understand how welfare agencies determine the eligibility of recipients and the appropriate level of benefits. Applicants for assistance are required to submit a signed application
2
form1 that inquires about all relevant factors for eligibility, including composition of the household, income, expenses, and
resources. Applicants may be required to submit documentary
verification of the information entered on the form, such as
paycheck stubs, birth certificates, or landlord statements.13
10. The AFDC program was established by the Social Security Act. 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-662 (1976 & Supp. 1 1978). The costs of benefits and administration are provided in part by the federal government and in part by state funds.
In some states, local government funds are also used to support the program.
See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF DATA

AND MATERIALS ON PUBLIC WELFARE PROGRAMS 18-19 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as STAFF DATA].
11. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1976). States also have the option of providing
assistance under the AFDC program to children deprived of parental support
by the unemployment of the child's father. Id. § 607. In 1978, twenty-six states,
Guam, and the District of Columbia elected to provide benefits to families with
unemployed fathers. STAFF DATA, supra note 10, at 11. The Supreme Court recently held that the restriction of the optional program to families with an unemployed father is an unconstitutional gender distinction and ordered that the
benefits of the unemployed father's program be extended to families in which
the mother satisfied the same standards. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76
(1979).
12. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a) (1) (ii) (1979).
13. Federal regulations mandate that eligibility decisions be supported by
facts in the case record, id § 206.10(a) (8), but do not mandate the form in
which those facts are recorded. States differ in the extent and variety of documentary verification demanded. See CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, 95M CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERN-

MENT OPERATIONS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE AFDC PROGRAM 36-37 (Comm. Print
1977) [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRATION REPORT].
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Most states require a personal interview and many also require
a visit to the applicant's home.14
Federal regulations require that the eligibility determination be made no later than forty-five days after submission of
the application.' 5 In a majority of states, the government official who makes the eligibility determination is not required to
have any education beyond the high school level.16 In most
states, the initial eligibility decision is reviewed before payment is authorized.' 7 Approval rates for AFDC applications
vary considerably from state to state. One study of application
decisions in 1975 showed a variation in approval rates from
twenty-five to eighty-five percent.18 Welfare agencies are required to reevaluate eligibility and benefit levels when any information about changed circumstances is received.' 9 Even in
the absence of such information, federal regulations require
states to redetermine eligibility no less frequently than every
six months.20
This Article examines the procedures afforded a recipient
who seeks to challenge the bureaucratic determination that
she 2 ' is no longer eligible for assistance or that her level of benefits should be reduced. From the inception of the AFDC program, some kind of hearing has been afforded at least some
people affected by adverse agency decisions; however, HEW
has never mandated that states continue benefits until after a
hearing decision when the issue to be considered is solely a
question of law. When the Social Security Act first established
the program for assistance to dependent children in 1935, it included a provision requiring the states to grant "to any individis denied, an
ual, whose claim with respect to aid ...
14. See ADmnnsn TIoN REPORT, supra note 13, at 33, 39. The Supreme
Court has upheld the constitutionality of requiring an applicant or recipient to
submit to a home visit as a condition for AFDC eligibility. Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309 (1971).
15. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10 (a) (3) (i) (1979).
16. See ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 44-45.
17. 1& at 46.
18. Id. at 52.
19. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a) (9) (ii) (1979).
20. Id. § 206.10(a) (9) (iii). At the time of redetermination, states require
submission of information forms and documentary verification similar to that
required for the initial determination. See ADMINSTRATION REPORT, supranote
13, at 42.
21. This Article uses the feminine gender to refer to AFDC recipients since
the vast majority of recipient families are headed by women. See U.S. DEP'T or
HEALTH, EDuc., AND WELFARE, PuB. No. 79-11721, AID To FAMILIEs wrTH DEPENDENT CHILDREN: A CHARTBOOK (1979).
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opportunity for a fair hearing before [the] state agency."2 2 In
1950, the Act was amended to add an opportunity for a hearing
when claims for benefits were "not acted upon with reasonable
promptness. '23 The statutory provisions for fair hearings, however, were never interpreted by HEW to require a hearing prior
to termination of assistance.24 Indeed, before 1968, HEW was
unwilling even to permit federal financial participation in payments made by a state to a recipient in the period between the
initial agency determination of ineligibility and the fair hearing.25
HEW broadly interpreted the statutory hearing requirement with respect to both the circumstances under which hearings were to be afforded and the scope of the hearings that
states were required to conduct. HEW required an opportunity
for a hearing not only when assistance was denied or delayed,
but also whenever an individual was "aggrieved by any other
agency action affecting his receipt or termination of assistance,
or by [any] agency policy as it affects his situation."2 6 Furthermore, HEW mandated that the opportunity for a fair hearing
include "[c] onsideration of the agency's interpretation of the
law, and the reasonableness and equitableness of the policies
promulgated under the law, if the claimant is aggrieved by their
application to his situation. '27 Thus, in January 1968, when the
first group of New York plaintiffs filed their complaint in the
lawsuit that was to become Goldberg v. Kelly, the law afforded
recipients a post-termination hearing that would permit a challenge to agency law and policy, but did not provide for any type
of hearing, or even for notification of an intent to terminate,
prior to the actual cessation of benefits.
In July 1968, after the initial Goldberg complaint was filed,
HEW issued a new directive requiring states to give advance
22. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 402(a) (4), 49 Stat. 620, 627
(1935) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1976)).
23. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, § 321(a), 64
Stat. 477, 549 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (4) (1976)).
24. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 257 n.3 (1970).
25. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
26. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION § 6200(b) (1968) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].

See A.

KEITH-LucAS, DECISIONS ABOUT PEOPLE IN NEED 161 (1957)

(quoting an

earlier edition of the Handbook). Despite broad availability, hearings were
only infrequently sought by recipients in the years preceding Goldberg. See J.
HANDLER & E. HoLLiNGswoRTH, THE "DESERVING POOR": A STuDY OF WELFARE

ADMINISTRATION 199-200 (1971); A. KErrH-LucAs, supra, at 163; Comment, Texas
Welfare Appeals: The Hidden Right, 46 TEx. L. REV. 223, 223 (1967).
27. HANDBOOK, supra note 26, § 6300(c)(2).
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notice that adverse action was planned and to provide recipients with an opportunity to discuss their situations before the
action took effect. 2 8 HEW also provided for an additional thirty
days of federal matching funds for states to maintain benefits
until this informal conference could be held.29 The state regulations challenged by the Goldberg plaintiffs3 0 were not in conformity with these HEW rules.31 The district court held that it
was a violation of due process to terminate welfare benefits unless there was notice and a hearing before an impartial hearing
officer at which the recipient could confront and cross-examine
32
witnesses.
Less than one week after the district court opinion was issued, HEW published a proposed rule that would require states
to continue welfare benefits until after a fair hearing decision
had been rendered.3 3 The proposed regulation limited the right
to continued benefits to those fair hearings "involving an issue
of fact, or of judgment relating to the individual case, between
the agency and the appellant."3 4 Although the regulation was
28.

See Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (citing HAND-

BOOK, supra note 26, § 2300(d) (5)).

29. See HANDBOOK, supra note 26, § 5514.
30. See Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 897 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
31. While the case was pending in federal district court, HEW was engaged
in negotiations with New York to make the required revisions in the New York
plan. See id. at 898 n.9. One apparent nonconformity in the New York regulation was its provision for an opportunity to make a written submission, rather
than the opportunity to appear in person for an informal conference as required by the HEW rule. The negotiations between HEW and New York were
exercised under HEW's statutory authority to discontinue the payment of federal funds to any state found to be in substantial noncompliance with the requirements of federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1976). The procedures used by
HEW in ascertaining nonconformity are now specified by regulation. See 45
C.F.R. § 213 (1979).
32. The district court explicitly declined to decide whether "procedural
due process requires the right to oral argument on a matter of law." Kelly v.
Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (citing FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265

(1949)).
The plaintiffs claimed that the New York regulations violated due process,
the Social Security Act, and the HEW regulations. 294 F. Supp. at 895. Since
some of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit were recipients of assistance under
programs financed solely by state and local funds to which the federal statutes
and regulations were inapplicable, the three-judge court chose not to consider
the Social Security Act and regulatory claims because the constitutional issue
would have to be decided nevertheless. I& at 902.
33. 33 Fed. Reg. 17,853 (1968).
34. 1d. 17,853; 17,854. State governors and welfare administrators expressed
opposition to the proposed regulation. See, e.g., Special Assistance for Policy
Coordination and Public Inquiries Division, Assistance Payments Administration, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, aand Welfare, Analysis of Comments Received on Fair Hearings, Thirteenth Policy Issuance (Dec. 30, 1968) (on file with
the Minnesota Law Review).
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promulgated, 35 it was subsequently revoked36 and never became effective.
When Goldberg came before the Supreme Court for oral
argument, an HEW rule then in effect required states to give
advance notice and an opportunity for an informal conference
before terminating welfare benefits. The proposed regulations
that would have required a formal hearing prior to termination
for cases presenting questions of fact or judgment had not yet
become effective. 3 7 The Court affirmed the district court's decision and held that "due process requires an adequate hearing
before termination of welfare benefits." 38 The Court then detailed the procedures that would satisfy due process in the
kinds of cases then before the Court.39 The Court characterized these cases as instances "where recipients have challenged proposed terminations as resting on incorrect or
misleading factual premises or on misapplication of rules or
policies to the facts of particular cases."40 In making this characterization, the Court failed to acknowledge a disagreement
between the plaintiffs and the federal government about
whether some of the Consolidated cases raised purely legal issues, 41 and thus avoided the more difficult issue of what proce35. In January 1969, in the closing days of the Johnson Administration,
HEW Secretary Wilbur J. Cohen approved the promulgation of the new regulation to govern fair hearings. The new regulation included the same language
restricting continued assistance to cases raising issues of fact or judgment used
in the proposed regulation. 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969) (proposed for codification
at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (1)). The effective date of the 1969 regulation was postponed by Robert H. Finch, the new HEW Secretary in the Nixon Administration. See 34 Fed. Reg. 13,595 (1969).
36. 34 Fed. Reg. 10,591 (1970).
37. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 257 n.3 (1970).
38. Id. at 261. In a companion case to Goldberg, Wheeler v. Montgomery,
397 U.S. 280 (1970), Justices Burger and Black argued in dissent that it would
have been appropriate to "hold the heavy hand of constitutional adjudication"
and allow the proposed regulations to take effect subject to later judicial review. Id. at 282 (Burger, J., dissenting).
39. The Court mandated the provision of timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity for
the recipient to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting
oral arguments and evidence. 397 U.S. at 267-68. The Court also required that
recipients have the opportunity to retain an attorney, although an attorney
need not be provided. Id. at 270. The Court also provided that the person assigned to decide the case must be impartial, and stated that impartiality could
be achieved if the decisionmaker had not participated in making the determination under review. Id. at 271. The Court required that cases be decided on the
hearing record and that the decisionmaker state the reasons for the decision
and the evidence relied upon. Id.
40. Id. at 268.
41. This disagreement centered on the case of Mrs. Altagracia Guzman.
Mrs. Guzman had been threatened with termination of her AFDC benefits un-
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dures would be required when a hearing was requested solely
to consider a question of law. In a footnote to the opinion, the
Court stated:
This case presents no question requiring our determination whether
due process requires only an opportunity for written submission, or an
opportunity both for written submission and oral argument, where
there are no factual issues in dispute or where the application of the
rule of law is not intertwined with factual issues.42

HEW immediately assumed that this footnote authorized welfare agencies to terminate benefits prior to a hearing decision
when there was no factual dispute involved. 43 Both the text of
the footnote and the context in which it was placed, however,
more strongly support a conclusion that the Supreme Court
was not concerned with whether due process required a prior
hearing for these cases, but rather what kind of prior hearing
would be required.4 4 The footnote was contained not in Part I
less she cooperated in an action for support against her husband. 397 U.S. at
app. 23a-25a. The complaint alleged that her proposed termination was "based
upon a policy of the Department which has no support at law and indeed is
contrary to the statutes of New York State." Id. at app. 25a. Despite the allegation in their complaint, the attorneys representing the welfare recipients argued that, in retrospect, it had become apparent that the issue raised by Mrs.
Guzman involved a "substantial question of judgment in the application of the
policy invoked." Brief for Appellees at 68 n.81, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). The United States, however, insisted that Mrs. Guzman's case challenged "only the provisions of law or settled agency policy." Brief of the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 33. The Court characterized the Guzman hearing as
one involving the applicability of departmental policy to the facts of a case. See
397 U.S. at 256 n.2. It is interesting that five years later the Supreme Court decided as a matter of law that New York's requirement of recipient cooperation
in paternity and support actions as a condition of eligibility for AFDC was in
violation of the Social Security Act. Lascaris v. Shirley, 420 U.S. 730 (1975). In
Lascaris,the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to render an extended opinion because an amendment to the Social Security Act had made such cooperation an explicit statutory eligibility condition. Social Services Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337, 2359 (1975) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 638 (1976)).
42. 397 U.S. at 268 n.15 (citing FCC v. WJIR 337 U.S. 265, 275-77 (1949)).
43. In an internal memorandum written less than a month after the
Goldberg decision, the agency administrator was informed that "[t] he continuation of assistance pending a hearing decision is limited to issues of fact with
regard to the individual situation." Possible Alternative Policy Positions regarding the Supreme Court Decision's [sic] re "Due Process," Attachment to
Memorandum from John J. Hurley, Deputy Administrator, Assistance Payments Administration, to John D. Twiname, Administrator, Social and Rehabilitation Service, at 1 (Apr. 14, 1970) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Possible Alternative Policy Positions]. The same policy
remains in effect today. See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (6) (i) (A) (1979).
44. This conclusion is reinforced by the Court's citation of FCC v. WJR, 337
U.S. 265, 275-77 (1949). On the specifically cited pages in that opinion the Court
had stated that the determination of whether due process requires an oral
hearing or merely an opportunity to submit a written statement depends on the
circumstances.
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of the opinion, which held that due process required a pre-termination hearing, but rather in Part H, which considered what
specific procedures would be required.45
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg,HEW
returned to its abandoned project,46 promulgating a regulation
to implement the court decisions on prior hearings. HEW began with the assumption that states should be permitted to terminate welfare benefits prior to a hearing decision when the
only issue raised is a question of law. The only questions
which, in HEW's view, had to be resolved with regard to this
policy were (1) the extent to which it would be necessary to define the categories of legal and factual issues; (2) which official
should make the determination of whether the case fell into a
category for which assistance was to be continued until a hearing decision; and (3) the appropriate point within the procedure for this determination to be made.
The first proposed regulation to respond to Goldberg was
published two months after the Supreme Court's decision.4 7
The proposed regulation limited the circumstances under
which assistance would have to be continued pending the hearing to cases involving "an issue of fact or of judgment relating
to the individual case."46 In making the determination of
whether there was an issue of fact or judgment, states were to
45. Sei 397 U.S. at 267.
46. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
47. 35 Fed. Reg. 8448 (1970) (proposed for codification at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10).
HEW combined into a single proceeding the hearing required by the Supreme
Court and the "fair hearing," see notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text,
mandated by the Social Security Act. See 35 Fed. Reg. 8448 (1970) (preamble).
The possibility of a combined hearing had been recognized by the Supreme
Court in Goldberg. See 397 U.S. at 267 n.14. A single, pre-termination fair hearing before the state agency was favored by HEW over the alternative of a combination of a pre-termination local hearing and an opportunity for a post.termination state "fair hearing," in part because of the expectation that state
policy would be improved in response to issues brought to the state's attention
through the hearing process. See Possible Alternative Policy Positions, supra
note 43, at 2.
48. The proposed regulation provided in partWhen a fair hearing, requested because of termination or reduction of
assistance, involves an issue of fact or of judgment relating to the individual case (including a question whether State agency rules or policies were correctly applied to the facts of the particular case),
assistance is continued during the period of the appeal and through the
end of the month in which the final decision on the fair hearing is
reached.
35 Fed. Reg. 8448, 8449 (proposed for codification at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (5)).
Portions of section 205.10 are being amended, see 45 Fed. Reg. 20480 (1980);
since the current amendments are not relevant to this Article further reference
to them will not be made.
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be guided by criteria 49 to be issued by the Social and Rehabilitation Service,50 the subagency of HEW then administering the
AFDC program.
The regulation to implement the Goldberg decision, largely
unchanged from the proposed regulation, became effective in
April 1971.51 The most significant changes clarified the circumstances in which the states were to continue benefits and the
procedures by which they were to determine whether the
maintenance of benefits was appropriate. Although the proposed regulation appeared to allow the local agencies to make
49. HEW issued a draft of criteria for the review and comment of state administrators and interested organizations. The draft criteria made little attempt to define the crucial terms, but rather offered a series of illustrative
examples. Draft: Criteria for Determining When Assistance Must Be Continued Pending a Fair Hearing Involving an Issue of Fact or Judgment, appended
to Social and Rehabilitation Service, U.S. Dep't of HEW, Information Memorandum AO-IM-19 (May 29, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Draft Criteria]. The examples of judgment issues involved exclusively situations in which the
recipient claimed that the welfare agency had misconstrued applicable state
policy and included no cases requiring assessment of unique facts. Id. at 1-4.
The broad scope given to issues of judgment appeared to undermine the stated
policy of the agency to limit the provision of assistance pending a hearing decision to cases involving "issues of fact with regard to the individual situation."
Id. at 4. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. The.only category of cases
described by the draft criteria for which assistance would not have to be continued were those raising "issues of agency policy." Included within this category were mere protests of agency policy, as well as claims of inconsistency
between state and federal requirements or challenges to the constitutionality
of state policies. Draft Criteria, supra, at 4-5. Recipient and legal groups objected to the draft criteria. Social and Rehabilitative Service, U.S. Dep't of
HEW, Outline, Fair Hearing Regulation Summary of Respondents to the Proposed Rule Making AO-IM-19, May 29, 1970, and Chief Issues (1970) at 9. The
standards ultimately issued by HEW were substantially changed from the initial draft.
50. 35 Fed. Reg. 8448, 8449 (1970) (proposed for codification at 45 C.FR.
§ 205.10(a) (5) (ii)). The welfare agencies were also required, under the proposed regulation, promptly to inform a recipient whether aid would be continued and afford the recipient prompt reconsideration by the state on the issue of
continuation. 35 Fed. Reg. 8448, 8449 (1970) (proposed for codification at 45
C.F.R. § 205.10 (a) (5) (iii)).
51. 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971) (codified at 45 CYF.. § 205.10 (1972)). The effective date of the regulation came nearly three and one-half years after HEW
had first proposed a regulation to provide for the continuation of welfare benefits until after a hearing. The agency's delay in issuing fair hearing regulations
was evidently a subject of some irritation to the administrator of the Social and
Rehabilitation Service. In a memorandum to the HEW Secretary requesting
promulgation of the final regulation, he wrote: "Finally, it is imperative that
this regulation be issued as soon as possible. As has already been indicated,
HEW has been massaging this regulation for over two years." Memorandum
from John D. Twiname, Administrator, Social and Rehabilitation Service, to
Secretary Elliot L. Richardson, at 5 (Feb. 1, 1971) (on file with the Minnesota
Law Review).
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the determination, 52 the regulation as implemented required
that the crucial determination of when continuation was appropriate be made by the state agency rather than the local agencies. 53 Under the regulation, benefits had to be continued in all
cases until that determination was made. 54 Furthermore, states
were given the option to maintain assistance until after the
hearing in all cases, regardless of whether an issue of fact or
judgment was involved. 55 A bulletin issued to the state administrators simultaneously with the promulgation of the regulation explained: "We recognize that it may be difficult in some
instances to make this distinction and would not want to penalize any State that, in the interest of simplified administration,
56
continues assistance in all cases."
In May 1971, the Social and Rehabilitation Service issued to
the states the promised criteria for distinguishing categories of
issues. The standards provided that issues of fact or judgment
included "issues of the application of State law or policy to the
facts of the individual situation."5 7 Issues of law or policy were
distinguished as those arising in cases in which the agency
could not rule in favor of the recipient without a change in
agency policy or state law.58 HEW, apparently deliberately,
gave no guidance regarding the proper categorization of cases
in which the recipient was seeking clarification or correct local
application of a state policy that would be uniformly applied to
others in similar factual circumstances.
As early as three months after HEW had completed its articulation of the fair hearing policy, a pattern of defiance by
52. 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971).
53. See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (5) (iii) (a) (1) (1972).
54. Id.
55. 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5)(iii)(b)
(1972)).
56. SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEW, SRS PROGRAM REGULATION 10-2 (C-3) 2, Feb. 13, 1971.
57. ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 6-30-20, at 6 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FAIR HEARING GUIDES].
58. Id. The agency also listed a number of examples, including the following:
An example of an issue involving application of agency policy to the individual situation may arise from the use of a ratable reduction. If
there is a question whether the formula for reducing the grant was correctly applied in an individual case, it is an issue of fact or judgment
and assistance must be continued. If the individual challenges the use
of a ratable reduction, he is questioning the policy itself, and assistance
would not need to be continued during the fair hearing process.
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state administrators began to emerge. 59 In September'1971, the
Assistance Payments Administration of the Social and Rehabilitation Service reported noncompliance with the hearing regulation in nineteen states. 60 Several of these states were not
merely delaying compliance, but had affirmatively expressed
an intention not to comply on the ground that the regulations
exceeded HEW's authority.6 1 The compliance reports for
several states mentioned litigation or the threat of litigation against HEW.62 Faced with the states' opposition and
59. One of the earliest signs of revolt was a letter to Secretary Richardson
from the state of Arizona, informing him that Arizona did not intend to comply
with some of the provisions of the regulation and threatening to sue HEW if it
would not be possible to arrange an accommodation of some of the regulation's
requirements. Letter from Arizona Assistant Attorney General James B. Feeley to HEW Secretary Elliot L. Richardson (Aug. 27, 1971) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review). One of Arizona's concerns was the requirement that
states provide a hearing, although not prior to the termination of benefits, for a
recipient who was affected by a change in law or policy. Id. See 36 Fed. Reg.
3034 (1971) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (5) (1972)). In October 1971,
Arizona filed suit against HEW, contending that the federal hearing regulation
violated the Social Security Act. Arizona v. Richardson, No. Civ. 71-563 PHXWCF (D. Ariz. June 16, 1972), reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement at 24-33,
Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412 U.S. 924 (1973). The district court stated, "Any hearing
on... rules or regulations without any issue of fact being involved is useless
and will tend to destroy our historic doctrine or principles of representative
form of government [sic]." Id. at 31. The court found that the federal regulation exceeded HEW's authority under the Social Security Act and enjoined the
agency from enforcing the regulation requiring states to hold hearings arising
out of changes in law or policy. Id. at 33. HEW's determination to pursue an
appeal waned as efforts began within HEW to amend the hearing regulation to
allow all states to deny hearings, as Arizona had done, when the hearing request arose out of a change in the law. See Docket, Arizona v. Richardson, No.
Civ. 71-563 PHX-WCF (D. Ariz. Aug. 14, 1972). Later in 1973, after the federal
language had been amended to incorporate the denial of such hearings, the
Ninth Circuit, upon the motion of both parties, vacated the district court judgment and remanded the case with directions that it be dismissed on the ground
of mootness. Arizona v. Weinberger, No. 92-2610 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 1973).
60. Assistance Payments Administration, Social and Rehabilitation Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, APA Compliance Report
9/30/71, Fair Hearings [hereinafter cited as Compliance Report], Enclosed with
Memorandum from Administrator, Social and Rehabilitation Service . [John D.
Twiname], to Secretary [Elliot L. Richardson] (Dec. 15, 1971) (both on file with
the Minnesota Law Review).
61. These states included New York, North Carolina, and Tennessee. Arizona, Colorado, and New Jersey expressed an intention not to comply but did
not state a reason. Compliance Report, supra note 60, at 16.
62. In addition to the Arizona suit, discussed in note 59 supra, the report
indicated that New York had filed suit and North Carolina had notified the
agency that it would join other states in a suit against HEW challenging the
regulations as more stringent than required by Goldberg. Compliance Report,
supra note 60, at 19. In New Jersey, the state defended a recipient action for
enforcement of the federal regulation on the ground that promulgation of the
regulation exceeded HEW's statutory authority. Serritella v. Engleman, 339 F.
Supp. 738, 751 (D.N.J. 1972). Characteristic of the mood in many states was the
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threatened litigation, the HEW Secretary directed the Social
and Rehabilitation Service to provide him with analysis of the
fair hearing requirements, their fairness to beneficiaries, and
their burden on the states. 63 When the requested analysis
finally emerged, the Administrator of the Social and Rehabilitation Service recommended that HEW's policy on fair hearings
be continued without change.64
The Administrator's analysis had demonstrated to the Secretary just how controversial the issue of policy hearings had
become. It was clear that some states would continue to protest vigorously the enforcement of existing regulations and that
recipient organizations would have strong objections to any
change. The Secretary's reaction to the Administrator's analysis and recommendation was apparently a decision not to decide-the issue was returned to the Assistance Payments
Administration for further study.
As part of its renewed study during the spring of 1972, the
Assistance Payments Administration conducted a series of
meetings with state welfare administrators and representatives
of the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) to discuss the agency's fair hearing policies. The states expressed
objections to the Goldberg requirement that benefits be maintained pending a hearing even when issues of fact or judgment
were involved. Some states reported large numbers of what
they considered to be frivolous hearings and increased costs in
millions of dollars. Although several states objected to the
specificity of the HEW regulations and the rigidity with which
they felt the regulations were being enforced, 65 Maryland
following note in the Compliance Report regarding negotiations between the
Tennessee welfare agency and the HEW regional office on compliance with the
fair hearing requirements. "At one point during regional negotiation, agency
was on verge of implementing the regulation, but when it discovered that other
States were objecting to it, [the agency] decided to be in the 'non-compliance'
camp." Compliance Report, supra note 60, at 20.
63. Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management Planning and Technology [Thomas S. McFee] to The Secretary [Elliot L. Richardson], Subject: SRS Management Conference held on November 9, 1971, at 3
(Nov. 16, 1971) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
64. Memorandum from Twiname to Richardson, supra note 60, at 6-7. The
Administrator wrote to the Secretary that amending the regulation to satisfy
the noncomplying states "would represent a substantial pull-back in the Department's long standing position that the recipient may have a fair hearing on
matters of policies as they affect his individual situation. This requirement assures a voice to consumers who ordinarily have to speak for themselves. A
change would without doubt be strongly opposed by recipient groups." Id at 5.
65. Assistance Payments Administration, Social and Rehabilitation Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Report on Meeting with State
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wanted greater guidance from HEW on hearing procedures and
particularly asked for more explicit federal guidelines to assist
states in distinguishing between questions of law or policy and
questions of fact or judgment. 66 NWRO questioned whether
the states could substantiate their claims for the burdensomeness of the regulations if they had never made a good faith effort to comply.67 NWRO expressed doubts about the accuracy
of state procedures for distinguishing between questions of fact
and questions of policy and requested that HEW develop pre68
cise procedures to guide the states in this determination.
In July, the Commissioner of the Assistance Payments Administration sent a questionnaire to the states asking them
to
the
costs
to
the
states,
to
express
their
dissatisfacdocument
tion with provisions of the regulation, and to comment on some
possible changes to the existing hearing regulation.69 All of the
questions to the states were designed to elicit specific facts and
data to support amendments to the rule.7 0 Nowhere in the
questionnaire were the states asked to comment on those portions of the rule that they found satisfactory or useful in the administration of their public assistance programs.
In December 1972, the Administrator of the Social and Rehabilitation Service presented to the Secretary of HEW a compilation of the results of the survey of state welfare
Administrators on Fair Hearings (Apr. 4, 1972) (on file with the Minnesota Law
Review).

66. Maryland specifically requested further detail on "(1) what should be
the order of testimony; (2) who should have the burden of proof; (3) what
should be the particular content of a hearing decision." Id. at 7.
67. Assistance Payments Administration, Social and Rehabilitation Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Report on Meeting with
NWRO [National Welfare Rights Organization] Representatives on Fair Hearings 2 (May 16, 1972) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
68. Id. at 3.
69. Memorandum from Commissioner, Assistance Payments Administration [John L. Costa], to SRS Regional Commissioners, Attention: Associate Regional Commissioners, APA (July 24, 1972) (on file with the Minnesota Law
Review).

70. The following inquiry from the questionnaire is illustrative of the nature of the effortISSUE ONE: A primary cause of the increase in fair hearing requests
and the additional costs States are experiencing is due
to capricious requests for hearings initiated by persons
trying to make unnecessary work and trouble for the
agency.
QUESTION: Please provide documentation with regard to any
additional costs your State may be incurring due to capricious requests for hearings including, if possible, the
numbers of such requests on a monthly or quarterly basis.
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administrators. Four of the eight states that participated in the
spring meeting failed to produce any substantiation of their
claims that the regulation was unduly burdensome. On most
issues, the states reported that they had no problems with the
existing regulation, although some states continued to report
7
difficulty in identifying questions of law or policy. '
It was not until the spring of 1973, after Caspar W. Weinberger had replaced Elliot L. Richardson as Secretary, that
HEW formally proposed to amend the hearing regulation 72 to
give states greater flexibility in designing their own administrative procedures. The preamble to the proposed regulation expressed the hope that the greater latitude given to the states
would result in the elimination of error and the reduction of
unnecessary program costs. Under the proposed regulation,
states could satisfy the Goldberg requirement of a pre-termination hearing by a proceeding before either the state agency or
the local welfare agency. The proposed rule would have removed the requirement that the determination of whether the
case raised an issue of fact or judgment had to be made by the
state agency, giving states the option of making that assessment at the local level.7 3 The proposed rule also omitted the requirement that the determination be made in accordance with
71. Memorandum from Administrator, Social and Rehabilitation Service
[John D. Twiname], to Secretary, HEW [Elliot L Richardson] (Dec. 19, 1972)
(on fie with the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter cited as December 1972
Memorandum]. Michigan reported confusion in understanding the phrase "issues of law or policy." Requirement for Fair Hearings on Issues of Law or Policy, Tab A of December 1972 Memorandum, supra, at 2. Alabama requested
further federal guidelines for distinguishing questions of policy from issues of
fact or judgment. State Responses on Issue Four, Tab C of December 1972
Memorandum, supra, at 1.
72. See 38 Fed. Reg. 9819 (1973). The proposed regulation was incorrectly
published by the Federal Register in the section reserved for the promulgation
of rules. Letter from Rose Steinman, Finding Aids Unit Chief, National
Archives and Records Service, Office of the Federal Register, to Professor
Laura Cooper (June 29,1978) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Steinman Letter].
73. This amendment was proposed over the strong objections of John L
Costa, Commissioner of the Assistance Payments Administration. In a letter to
the Administrator of the Social and Rehabilitation Service, Costa listed six reasons for considering the amendment ill-advised. Among those, he expressed
concern that local agencies would not have ready access to specialists, such as
lawyers, who could make a reliable differentiation between issues of law or policy and issues of fact or judgment. He also expressed concern that local determination would result in erroneous denials of continued assistance and in a
lack of uniformity and objectivity in welfare administration. Costa asked that
the Office of the Secretary be informed of the opposition of the Assistance Payments Administration to the proposed amendment. Letter from John L. Costa
to John D. Twiname (Feb. 6, 1973) (on fie with the Minnesota Law Review).
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criteria established by the Social and Rehabilitation Service.
Instead, states would be free to decide, without federal guidance, whether recipients were entitled to continued assistance
pending their hearings. Under the proposed regulation states
were afforded the discretion to deny fair hearings on questions
of policy so long as there was an alternative procedure for communicating views concerning agency policy to state welfare officials.74 Consistent with that change, the proposed rule omitted
language in the regulation that required fair hearings to include consideration of the reasonableness and equitableness of
agency policies.7 5
Although the public response to the proposed regulation
was overwhelmingly negative, 6 comments from state welfare
74. The proposed regulation would have providedAn opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency will be
granted to any individual who requests a fair hearing because his claim
for financial or medical assistance is denied, or is not acted upon with
reasonable promptness, or because he is aggrieved by any other
agency action affecting receipt, suspension, reduction, or termination of
such assistance, and who raises an issue of fact or judgment relating to
the individual case, including a question of whether the State agency
rules or policies were correctly applied to the facts of the particular
case. An opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency will
likewise be granted to an individual whose request raises only an issue
of State agency policy, unless there is made available an alternative
procedure whereby views concerning State agency policy can be communicated to officials of the State agency.
38 Fed. Reg. 9819, 9820 (1973).
75. The proposed language omitted the phrase in the then-existing regulation that entitled a recipient to a fair hearing if he was aggrieved "by agency
policy as it affects his situation." Compare id. with 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971)
(codified at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (3) (1972)).
76. Almost 700 letters were received. See 38 Fed. Reg. 22,005 (1973) (preamble). Of the 255 responses that directed comments to the issuance as a
whole, 15 letters favored the regulation, 233 were against it, and 7 were undecided. Assistance Payments Administration, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education,
and Welfare, Summary of Replies Re: AO-IM-73-29, at 1 (undated) (on file with
the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter cited as APA Summary]. The responses were summarized as follows:
The responses stressed the undue hardship to recipients, the fact that
the proposed regulation violated the constitutiohal rights of applicants
and recipients, and were punitive, restrictive, and regressive. They further pointed out that the proposed regulation increased administrative
inefficiency and complicated the application process as well as sanctioned abuses by the agency.
Id. at 1.
Of the 96 letters that addressed the option of transferring fair hearing responsibilities to local agencies, 91 opposed the provision. The opponents to local hearings included all eight state and federal legislators who responded,
both of the nonwelfare government officials, and all 27 legal aid groups who
commented on the issue. The general consensus was that impartial decisionmaking at the local level was impossible. All five responses in favor of local
hearings came from state or local welfare agencies. Id at 2-4. A different sum-
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agencies were generally favorable. 71 The regulation 78 was
79
promulgated in the summer of 1973 largely without change
and remains in effect today.80
The new regulation made one significant change in the procedure by which welfare agencies were to determine whether a
case raised an issue of fact or judgment, a change that resulted
from a three-judge district court decision. In Yee-Litt v. Richardson,8 1 a suit had been brought against the California state
welfare department in the fall of 1971, just months after the effective date of the first federal hearing regulation. 82 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that
state and federal regulations unconstitutionally permitted the
state to deny continuation of assistance to recipients who had
mary of the same comments to the proposed regulation reported that 17 state
or local welfare agencies commented on the provision of local evidentiary hearings and that all but three of these favored allowing states this option. Summary of Comments, Attachment to Memorandum from Francis D. DeGeorge,
Acting Administrator, Social and Rehabilitation Service, to Secretary [Caspar
W. Weinberger], at 1 (June 14, 1973) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as DeGeorge Memorandum].
Of the 51 correspondents who stated an opinion on the optional use of a
grievance procedure in lieu of hearings on issues of law or policy, three were in
favor and 48 were opposed. Those in favor of the grievance procedure alternative believed that it would reduce unnecessary administrative costs. Those opposed considered the provision a violation of due process and expressed
concern that it would cause undue hardship from loss of assistance pending the
hearing decision and would eliminate the most effective way for recipients to
challenge agency policy. Several commented on the difficulty of distinguishing
questions of fact from questions of policy. APA Summary, supra,at 7, app. AS1, A5-2.
77. DeGeorge Memorandum, supra note 76, at 1.
78. 38 Fed. Reg. 22,005 (1973). The preamble gives an incorrect citation to
the proposed version of the regulations promulgated therein. The regulations
promulgated at 38 Fed. Reg. 22,005 (1973) were proposed at 38 Fed. Reg. 9819
(1973). Steinman Letter, supra note 72.
79. As had been proposed, the new regulation gave states the option of
providing hearings before the state agency or before a local hearing officer. 45
C.F.R. § 205.10 (1979). Consistent with the objective of giving states greater
flexibility in administration, states were given the authority to determine, without federal guidelines, whether a recipients hearing request raised an issue of
fact or judgment, or solely a question of law or policy. Id. § 205.10 (a) (6) (i) (A).
Since local agencies could now provide fair hearings, they were also given
authority to determine whether a case raised any issues entitling the recipient
to continued assistance until the hearing was decided. Id. § 205.10(a)(1),
.10(a) (6) (i) (A).
80. Id. § 205.10.
81. 353 F. Supp. 996 (ND. Cal.), affd mem. sub nonr Carleson v. Yee-Litt,
412 U.S. 924 (1973).
82. The HEW secretary was also named as a defendant, but the court dismissed the action as to the federal defendant because the plaintiffs had not
challenged the federal statute as unconstitutional under 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970)
(repealed 1976). 353 F. Supp. at 1001 n.3.
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sought appeals. 83
The plaintiffs offered three theories in support of their
claim that this procedure was unconstitutional: (1) due process requires an opportunity for a pre-termination hearing in all
cases, regardless of the issues raised by the appeal; (2) the requirement that welfare recipients articulate the basis of their
appeals and demonstrate the existence of an issue of fact was
an unfair burden that resulted in a deprivation of their right to
a hearing; and (3) the fact-policy distinction was so vague and
lacking in standards that decisionmaking was arbitrary and
thus deprived recipients of a hearing in violation of their due

process rights.84
The court's opinion on the first issue, whether due process
requires a pre-termination hearing in all cases, is not entirely
clear. Although there is language indicating that the court
agreed with the defendants on this issue,8 5 other language sug83. Although "appeal" is generally used to describe the proceeding used
by a superior court to review a judgment of a lower court, see BLAcK's LAw
DIcTIoNARY 88-89 (5th ed. 1979), in welfare administration the term has traditionally been used to describe the initial administrative adjudicatory proceeding [the hearing] to review the bureaucratic determination of the recipient's
eligibility or benefit level. See, e.g., 353 F. Supp. at 997-98. The latter use of the
term will be followed throughout this Article.
84. 353 F. Supp. at 998.
85. The court cited three cases that it claimed stated "evidentiary hearings
are needed only where factual contentions are raised." Id. Although it recognized that the decisions were not on point, the court stated that they supported
the defendants' position that "no prior hearing is required by due process
where no facts are in dispute." Id. In this respect, the court appears to have
confused two distinct issues: (1) whether a prior hearing is required; and (2)
the extent to which the procedures at such a heaiing vary with the nature of
the issue to be considered.
One of the cases cited by the court as holding that no prior hearing is required involved a state welfare agency's challenge to the procedures afforded to
it prior to a threatened cut-off of federal funds. Connecticut State Dep't of Pub.
Welfare v. HEW, 448 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1971). The state had, in fact, been granted
a prior hearing, but it claimed that it should have had the opportunity to examine federal officials about the basis of their regulations. The court held that
since there were no adjudicatory facts at issue, it was sufficient to have provided the state with an opportunity for oral argument on the legal questions at
issue. Id. at 212.
The two other cases cited by the Yee-Litt court as support for the claim
that no prior hearing is required by due process where no facts are in dispute
were inapposite for another reason. Unlike the plaintiffs in Yee-Litt, the plaintiffs in these two cases were challenging not individual decisions affecting their
benefits, but statewide changes in policy. Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.
1971); Provost v. Betit, 326 F. Supp. 920 (D. Vt 1971). In Russo, plaintiffs were
challenging the reversal of a policy that had allowed strikers to collect welfare
benefits. In Provost, plaintiffs were challenging a newly adopted method for
calculation of welfare benefits that affected every recipient in the state. In both
cases, the hearing sought by the plaintiffs was more like a rulemaking proceeding than an adjudicatory proceeding.
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gests that the court agreed with the plaintiffs.8 6 The court
found it unnecessary to decide the second issue, whether the
California procedures placed an unconstitutional burden on
welfare recipients to plead the existence of a factual issue, and
resolved the case on the plaintiffs' third argument. The court
held that the fact-policy distinction, as it was applied in California, resulted in the denial of aid to recipients who were constitutionally entitled to continued payments. 87 The court found
that the state, "even when using its best effort with seemingly
innovative regulations," could not avoid making many erroneous determinations.8 8 According to the court, the fault did not
lie with the state, but rather with the "unclear and unmanageable fact-policy distinction which the regulations have created." 89 The court therefore enjoined the state from
withholding welfare assistance to persons who had made a
timely request for a fair hearing.9 0 California sought review in
the United States Supreme Court, but the Court summarily affirmed. 91
One might suppose that this decision would have put an
end to the fact-policy distinction and that states thereafter
would be directed to continue benefits in all cases until the appeal was decided. In fact, HEW chose to read the Yee-Litt decision as narrowly as possible in order to give states flexibility in
designing hearing procedures. Rather than abandoning the
fact-policy distinction entirely, HEW merely moved its application to a later stage in the proceedings. Under Goldberg,it was
86. Immediately following its statement that the "fact-policy distinction
[was] not viable," the court cited, as a case with a similar conclusion, Mothers'
and Children's Rights Org. v. Sterrett, 467 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1972). 353 F. Supp.
at 1000. The Sterrett case held that welfare recipients are entitled to a hearing,
prior to termination, to present legal arguments, even if no factual issues are
raised. See 467 F.2d at 800-01. The Sterrett case also distinguished two of the
three cases the Yee-Litt court cited to support defendants' arguments, see note
85 supra, on the ground that they had merely held that evidentiary hearings
are not required on issues of law. Id. at 800 n.10.
87. 353 F. Supp. at 1000-01.
88. Id. at 1000.
89. Id. at 1001.
90. Id. One judge dissented in part. He apparently agreed with the majority's discussion of the issues, but would have denied broad injunctive relief. Id
(Hamlin, J., concurring and dissenting).
91. Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412 U.S. 924 (1973). A summary affirmance applies
to the judgment only and not necessarily to the court's reasoning. Such an affirmance prevents lower courts from reaching opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented. A summary affirmance should not be considered as
breaking new ground, but rather as applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts involved. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176

(1977).
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clear that, at least for cases involving a question of fact or judgment, benefits had to continue until the appeal had been decided.9 2 Read most narrowly, the decision in Yee-Litt merely
prevented the state from terminating benefits prior to the hearing; it did not explicitly state that benefits must be continued
until after the appeal was decided. HEW was therefore able to
specify in the regulation following Yee-Litt that states continue
benefits until a decision on the appeal is rendered after a hearing unless "[a] determination is made at the hearing that the
sole issue is one of State or Federal law or policy, or change in
State or Federal law and not one of incorrect grant computation." 93 The result is that states must continue benefits until
the appeal is decided if there is an issue of fact or judgment;
but if it is determined at the hearing that the only issue is a
question of law or policy, the state may discontinue benefits
immediately, even though no decision has yet been rendered
on the issues raised by the appeal.
In addition to this response to the Yee-Litt decision, the
new regulations differed from the proposed regulations in defining the circumstances in which the states were obligated to
provide any hearing at all. In the preamble to the regulation,
HEW acknowledged that most of the public responses indicated disagreement with the proposal that states be allowed to
offer grievance procedures in lieu of hearings on questions of
law or policy on the basis that the existing hearing procedure
provided "a viable mechanism for effecting changes in policy." 94 The regulation as promulgated, 95 however, not only al92. Goldberg held that due process required "an adequate hearing before
termination of welfare benefits," 397 U.S. at 261, and defined an adequate hearing to include a decision that states reasons and the evidence relied upon. Id.
at 271.
93. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (6) (i) (A) (1979). States apparently retain the option to continue assistance in all cases regardless of the issue raised. This option was explicit in the prior regulation, but is implicit in the current
regulation. The old regulation stated, "Alternatively, the State may provide for
continuing assistance in all cases." 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971) (codified at 45
C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (5) (iii) (b) (1972)). Under the current rule, quoted in the text
accompanying this footnote, a state could continue assistance in all cases if it
never made a determination at the hearing that the sole issue was one of law or
policy. Letter from Stephanie W. Naidoff, HEW Regional Attorney, to Magistrate Richard A. Powers (Apr. 30, 1974); Exhibit A to Consent Decree, Hackman
v. Wohlgemuth, No. 73-1652 (ED. Pa. Nov. 19, 1974).
94. 38 Fed. Reg. 22,005, 22,006 (1973). For a more complete summary of the
comments regarding this provision, see note 76 supra and accompanying text.
95. The regulation as promulgated allowed states to deny or dismiss a request for a hearing "where the sole issue is one of State or Federal law requiring automatic grant adjustments for classes of recipients." 38 Fed. Reg. 22,005,
22,008 (1973) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (5) (v) (1979)). If states choose to
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lowed states to deny hearings to recipients who had been
adversely affected by changes in the law, but also deleted the
requirement of an alternative grievance procedure for bringing
96
concerns to the attention of state officials.
In summary, the 1973 amendments made significant
changes from the first hearing regulation that had been promulgated in 1971. Despite fears of partiality and an absence of adequate legal expertise, local hearing officers were permitted to
decide appeals and to determine whether an appeal raised an
issue of fact or judgment. Despite the well-documented difficulty in establishing clear federal definitions that would allow
hearing officers accurately to distinguish questions of law or
policy from issues of fact or judgment, hearing officers were allowed to make these distinctions without any federal guidelines and without any requirement that states establish their
own uniform guidelines. Despite long-standing HEW policy
that the interests of sound welfare administration were best
served by ensuring that recipients could bring challenges to
state policy to the attention of state officials,9 7 states were not
required to provide a hearing or any other grievance procedure
provide hearings on changes in law or poLicy, they may consolidate individual
appeals into a single group hearing. 38 Fed. Reg. 22,005, 22,007-08 (1973) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (5) (iv)). Consistent with these changes, HEW deleted the language that had required states to consider the reasonableness and
equity of agency policies at fair hearings. See note 75 supra and accompanying
text.
96. The preamble's explanation for this complete reversal of long-standing
HEW policy was a modest one. The preamble stated only, "The provision regarding a grievance system has been deleted since 'expression of views' on program policy is part of legislative and rulemaking procedures." 38 Fed. Reg.
22,005-06 (1973). The staff of the agency, in apparent error, explained to the
Secretary that this amendment was a response to the Yee-Litt decision, a case
that pertained only to the circumstances under which assistance was continued
and not the circumstances under which a hearing had to be offered. A memorandum to the HEW Secretary seeking the Secretary's approval to promulgate
the new hearing regulation explained the change in § 205.10 (a) (5):
Section (5) has been rewritten to conform to the decision in Yee-Litt v.
Carleson, et al, recently affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court. After
discussion with the attorney general who argued the case, it was determined that the State need not grant a hearing where a change in grant
results from a statewide change required by the implementation of a
change in State or Federal law. If the State wishes, it may provide a
forum for grievances about such changes through group hearings.
DeGeorge Memorandum, supra note 76, at 2. The Secretary appears to have
been misinformed about the reason for this change. It might have been more
accurately explained as a delayed response to the decision of the federal district court in Arizona v. Richardson, No. Civ. 71-563 PHX-WCF (D. Ariz. June 16,
1972). See note 59 supra.
97. See notes 47, 64 supra and accompanying text.
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for such challenges. 98
The 1973 regulation, which remains in effect today, was
designed to allow states as much discretion in designing hearing policies as HEW's interpretation of the governing statutory
and constitutional law allowed. This Article examines the correctness of HEW's assessment of the legality of its current regulation governing the provision for hearings on questions of
law. Before turning to that question, however, it is appropriate
to determine how the states currently exercise the discretion
they have under the regulation to discontinue assistance before
hearing decisions are rendered in appeals that raise no factual
questions.
III THE EXERCISE OF STATE DISCRETION TO
IMPLEMENT HEW REGUlATIONS ALLOWING
STATES TO DISCONTINUE ASSISTANCE PRIOR
TO A HEARING DECISION ON
A QUESTION OF LAW
Under the federal regulation, 99 states are given a choice between two methods of handling the continuation of assistance
pending a hearing on a recipient's appeal from a notice of intent by the welfare agency to reduce or terminate benefits.
Under the first method, a state may continue assistance until a
decision is rendered on the appeal regardless of the nature of
the issues raised.100 Alternatively, if the hearing officer determines that the sole issue is one of law or policy, a state may
immediately implement the change in the welfare grant indicated by the agency's notice, even though a decision on the
merits of the appeal has not yet been rendered.o' This section
examines how states have exercised the discretion afforded
them by the federal regulation. Do states choose the administratively easier but potentially more expensive method of continuing assistance in all cases? Or, do they attempt to make the
difficult assessment in each case of whether the appeal raises
98. The justification offered for these changes was to allow states maximum flexibility in the administration of their welfare programs. See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra. The intent to provide states greater flexibility in
welfare administration was stated to the Secretary as the reason for the new
hearing regulation in a memorandum seeking the Secretary's approval to promulgate the regulation. DeGeorge Memorandum, supra note 76, at 4.
99. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (6) (i) (A) (1979).
100. See Hackman v. Wohlgemuth, No. 73-1652 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1974).
101. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
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no issues of fact or judgment and thereupon terminate or reduce benefits pending a hearing decision?
In an effort to determine the answers to these questions, a
survey was conducted of state welfare administrators. Letters
inquiring about the state's policy Were sent in the spring of 1978
to state welfare department administrators of all fifty states
and the District of Columbia.l02 Thirty-three states indicated
that their state policy allows the hearing officer to determine
that the only issue is a question of law or policy and to terminate or reduce benefits if such a finding is made.103 Under the
actual practice of seven of these thirty-three states, however,
benefits are rarely, if ever, changed until the full decision on
the appeal is rendered. 0 4 In the remaining eighteen jurisdictions, no attempt is made at the hearing to decide whether the
appeal raises only questions of law or policy, because benefits
are continued in all cases.10 5 Thus, the survey revealed that as
many as two-thirds of the states have policies that permit the
state welfare agency to terminate or reduce benefits of recipi102. After citing the governing federal regulation and briefly describing the
choice that the state is given under it, the letter asked each administrator,
"Does your state terminate AFDC payments to a recipient before a hearing decision where the only issue raised by the recipient's appeal is a question of
law?" States were also asked to supply copies of any sections of state regulations or manuals in which this hearing policy was articulated. Forty-four states
returned the questionnaire by mail. The remaining seven jurisdictions were
contacted by telephone during the summer of 1978.
103. These states included Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Although New York has a regulation providing for the termination
of assistance if it is determined that there is no issue of fact or judgment, at the
time of the survey New York was subject to an injunction that prevented it
from utilizing that regulation. See Viverito v. Smith, 76 Civ. 4151 (MEL)
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1976). Since July 1979, however, New York has been able to
implement its regulation. See Viverito v. Smith, 76 Civ. 4151 (MEL) (S.D.N.Y.
July 6, 1979). The materials supplied by Arkansas and Montana suggest that
these states might be violating the federal regulation by effecting a change in
benefits prior to the hearing in cases in which there appear to be no issues of
fact or judgment.
104. These states included Arizona; Maryland, Ohio, Utah, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The information was volunteered in response to the
survey. It is not known whether other states that have a policy of early discontinuation also fail to implement it.
105. These included Alabama, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. The
Pennsylvania policy was adopted pursuant to a consent decree. See Hackman
v. Wohlgemuth, No. 73-1652 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1974).
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ents whose appeals question the validity of agency law or policy rather than the agency's judgment or assessment of facts.
In view of the recognized difficulty in making the fact-law
distinction,106 it is surprising that so many states apparently
believe that they can accurately apply the distinction to determine whether to continue welfare benefits. It is also surprising
that these states have not found it necessary to provide definitions or examples of the relevant categories in their state
manuals or regulations to assist hearing officers in making that
07
determination.
In the absence of guidance by the states, how do hearing
officers decide whether the issues raised by recipient appeals
are issues of fact or law? It may be that hearing officers make
their determinations without the benefit of any formal definitions. Or, it may be that hearing officers use definitions supplied by HEW, not for the purpose of providing guidance in
program administration, but rather for the purpose of obtaining
data from the states on public assistance hearings. The Social
Security Act requires that states must, as a condition for the
receipt of federal funds for the AFDC program, '"make such reports, in such form and containing such information, as the
Secretary may from time to time require." 0 8 When the government compiles its annual report of Requests for Hearings in
Public Assistance, it asks the states to supply information
about hearings involving the federally-aided Medical AssistanceZ09 and AFDC programs," 0 including data about the nature
106.

See, e.g., Letter from Lee C. McClelland, Manager-Hearings Unit,

Adult and Family Services Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources,
to Professor Laura Cooper (Apr. 20, 1978) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) ("Our experience led us to the conclusion that line staff had considerable difficult [sic] making the distinction.... ."). See also note 49 supra.
107. Of the thirty-five states that supplied copies of state manuals or regulations, only Vermont had regulations that attempted to define the categories and
provide examples for the benefit of hearing officers. 1 VT.REG.HumA SERVICES § 1251 (Vt. Dep't Soc. Welfare 1976). Vermont continues benefits pending
appeal in all cases, but if the agency's position is upheld after a hearing concerning only an issue of law or policy, the agency attempts to recoup any benefits continued solely as a result of the recipient's appeal. Id. at § 1253.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (6) (1976).
109. Medical Assistance, a program financed by state and federal funds,
pays for medical care for certain needy families and individuals. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396-1396(j) (1976) (amended 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396-1396k (West Supp. 1980)).
110. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, OFFICE OF PoucY, SOCIAL SEcTRrTY ADmINIsTRATioN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REQUESTS FOR HEARINGS IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, FISCAL YEAR 1977, at 1 (Oct. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as 1979 STATISTICAL REPORT]. During this reporting period,
on a national basis, about 80% of the hearing requests arose from the AFDC
program and 20% from the Medical Assistance Program. Id. at 8 (Table 2).
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of the issues for which appeals are requested. The states divide their appeal requests into three categories: protest of
agency policy, challenge of law or agency policy, and protest of
agency facts or judgment."' Although HEW supplies definitions of these categories in the instructions for completing the
report form,112 an enormous amount of ambiguity remains.
What is the difference between a challenge to agency policy
and a protest of agency law or policy? Can an appeal challenge
policy or protest law? How is the state to distinguish between a
protest of an agency judgment and a challenge of state law?
How is the state to categorize a case in which there are no disputed issues of fact, but the recipient is asking the agency to
determine the correct state policy to apply to cases with similar
factual circumstances?
Given these ambiguous definitions, one might expect that
the states have considerable difficulty in accurately and consistently supplying the data requested by HEW. The information supplied by the states and reported by HEW tends to
confirm that expectation. In the report on requests for hearings
During the reporting period, the regulations that governed hearings in the
AFDC program also applied to the Medical Assistance Program. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 205.10(a) (1977).
111. 1979 STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 12 (Table 6). HEW stated
that the reason it asks states to use these categories is the federal regulation
that prevents states from suspending assistance pending a hearing decision unless a determination is made at the hearing that the "sole issue is one of State
or Federal law or policy, or change in State or Federal law." Letter from Anne
Henneman, Family Assistance Studies Staff, Office of Research and Statistics,
Social Security Administration to Professor Laura Cooper (May 24, 1978) (on
file with the Minnesota Law Review). The federal regulation is 45 C.FR.
§ 205.10(a) (6) (i) (A) (1979).
112. 8. Nature of request-Enter the number of requests according to
the nature of the request, i.e., whether the claimant's request protested
the agency's action on the basis of agency policy and the facts or judgments related to his case; or protested the agency's policy that led to
the agency's action in his case and in all other cases of individuals in
similar circumstances.
a. Protest of agency policy-Enter the number of requests concerned
with actions and policies of the agency that affect not only the
claimant's situation, but other persons in similar circumstances; include here situations in which the claimant agreed that the
agency's policy was correctly applied in his case but requested a
hearing to protest the agency policy itself.
b. Challenge of law or agency policy-Enter the number of requests
in which the claimant has challenged either Federal or State law.
c. Protest of agencyfacts orjudgment-Enterthe number of requests
that concerned an agency action(s) that affected the claimant's situation only and which protest the agency's action on the basis of
facts or judgments in his case.
Social and Rehabilitation Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Action Transmittal, SRS-AT-76-173 (NCSS) 5-6 (Dec. 2, 1976).
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in public assistance covering the period from October 1, 1976 to
September 30, 1977, the government reported that 20% of hearing requests nationwide were protests of agency policy, 8.1%
were challenges of law or agency policy, and 71.9% were protests of agency facts or judgment." 3 These national totals obscure the wide disparities in the data reported by individual
states. Two jurisdictions reported that more than ninety percent of their appeals were protests of agency policy" 4 and eight
jurisdictions reported that more than ninety percent of their
appeals were protests of agency facts or judgment." 5 If it can
be assumed that there are not, in fact, such broad differences in
the hearings caseload among the states, the disparity in the
states' reports suggest that the states cannot make accurate determinations of the nature of welfare appeal requests, at least
with the categories and definitions currently supplied by
HEW.116 Doubts about the accuracy of state determinations
113. 1979 STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 12 (Table 6). For the period from January to June 1976, 29.6% were protests of agency policy, 5.1% were
challenges of law or agency policy, and 65.3% were protests of agency facts or
judgment. NATIONAL CENTER FOR SocIAL STATISTICS, OFFICE OF INFORMATION
SYSTEMS, SocIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HEARINGS IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, JANUARY-JUNE 1976, at 16
(Table 11) (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 STATISTICAL REPORT].
114. 1979 STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 12 (Table 6). In the previous report, three jurisdictions had reported that more than 90% of their appeals
were protests of agency policy. 1977 STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 16
(Table 11). At that time, two of these three states placed more than 99% of
their appeals in the category of protest of agency policy. Id.
115. 1979 STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 12 (Table 6). In the previous report, nine states reported that more than 90% of their appeals were protests of agency facts or judgment. 1977 STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 113, at
16 (Table 11). At that time, five of these nine jurisdictions reported that cases
in this category exceeded 99% of their caseload. Id.
116. It is possible that there is little relationship between the hearing issue
categorization process used for statistical reporting purposes and the decisions
by hearing officers who categorize issues in order to determine whether benefits are to be continued. For example, it could be that in a particular state, the
hearing officers make categorization determinations with the benefit of expertise and the exercise of extreme care, while the categorization for statistical reporting purposes is done by an inexperienced clerk with little motivation to
make accurate determinations. It is unlikely, however, for states to have two
separate employees reviewing all of the welfare appeals files to make determinations of the nature of the issues raised by the appeals. It is more likely that,
at least in those states that purport to use the issue determination as a basis
for discontinuation of benefits, it is the hearing officer's determination that is
also used for statistical reporting purposes. If that is true, in comparing the list
of states in which the hearing officers make issue determinations, see notes 103104 supra,with those reporting more than ninety percent of their hearings in a
single issue category, see notes 114-115 supra, it appears that the statistical report may be evidence that hearing officers are not making accurate issue determinations.
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are also raised by evidence that some states use no definitions
for categorizing their caseload,"n7 and that in other states,
where cases are categorized by several different people, there
may be significant differences in the interpretations of HEW
8
categories by those who supply data for the state report."
In summary, available evidence demonstrates that (1) a
substantial number of states attempt to categorize cases according to the nature of the issue raised in order to discontinue
assistance pending an appeal decision, and (2) the likelihood of
error in making that determination, even if not made until the
hearing, is substantial.
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUTORY VALIDITY OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS PERMITTING
DISCONTINUATION OF WELFARE ASSISTANCE
PRIOR TO THE HEARING DECISION IN CASES
RAISING QUESTIONS OF LAW
This section assesses whether discontinuation of assistance prior to a hearing decision in cases raising only legal issues, a procedure authorized by the federal regulation and
currently practiced by many states, is permissible under the
federal statutory provisions governing the administration of the
AFDC program. As an initial matter, it is necessary to isolate
for examination the regulation that permits the discontinuation
of assistance from a related regulation that permits the denial
of hearings. Current federal regulations governing welfare
hearings invite the states to distinguish appeals raising questions of law from other types of cases for two distinct purposes-the denial of hearings and the discontinuation of
benefits. First, a hearing need not be granted at all "when either State or Federal law requires automatic grant adjustments
for classes of recipients unless the reason for an individual ap117. In Minnesota, the person who types the hearing officers' decisions is
responsible for compiling the data on the nature of the appeal issue for the
HEW report. She has not been supplied with any written definitions for the
categories. Interview with Mari Konesky, Appeals Section, Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, in Minneapolis, Minnesota (May 22, 1978). Cf.note 107
supra (lack of guidance in regulations for hearing officers).
118. An inquiry from the author led Massachusetts to survey how its welfare referees categorize cases. It discovered that there were disparities in the
interpretations given the HEW categories by different referees. The referees
were inconsistent in their categorization of cases that called for interpretation
of regulations. Letter from Susan G. Bartholomew, Director, Division of Hearings, Department of Public Welfare, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to Professor Laura Cooper (July 31, 1978) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
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peal is incorrect grant computation."1 9 States are therefore
granted the specific authority to deny or dismiss a request for a
hearing if such an automatic grant adjustment is the sole issue
raised by the appeal. 20 Second, if a recipient makes a timely
request for a hearing, welfare benefits must be continued until
a decision is rendered after a hearing unless a determination is
made at the hearing "that the sole issue is one of State or Federal law or policy, or change in State or Federal law and not
21
one of incorrect grant computation."1
The relationship between these two provisions is not readily apparent. Do the regulations require that, if an appeal is requested following an automatic grant adjustment, benefits must
be continued at least until an official determines at a hearing
whether the validity of such an adjustment is the only issue
raised by the appeal? HEW would say "no." Under HEW's interpretation of its own regulation, if the recipient is notified
that benefits are to be affected by an automatic grant adjustment, the change may be implemented ten days from the date
of notice.122 Benefits are continued until the hearing only if the
recipient alleges that her payment was incorrectly computed.
If the hearing officer subsequently determines that the recipient was not actually contesting computation, but only challenging the validity of the automatic grant adjustment, the hearing
officer may both dismiss the hearing and discontinue benefits.'2
Unlike recipients affected by automatic grant adjustments
for classes of recipients, recipients who raise questions of law
that do not arise out of automatic grant adjustments are always
entitled to a hearing and to maintenance of their benefits until
the time of the hearing. In this latter category of cases, benefits
may be immediately discontinued at the time of the hearing,124
even though the recipient continues to be entitled to a decision
on the merits of the claim. If the hearing officer's ultimate deci119. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (5) (1979).
120. Id. §205.10(a)(5)(v).
121. Id. § 205.10(a) (6) (i) (A).
122. Commissioner, Assistance Payments Administration, Social and Rehabilitative Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Policy Information Memo No. 24 (Feb. 27, 1974). The ten-day notice provision is contained in
45 C.FPR. §§ 205.10(a) (4) (i) (A), (iii) (1979).
123. A recent decision of a federal district court, however, disagreed with
HEW's view and permanently enjoined the state of Florida from affecting recipients' benefits by automatic grant adjustments until it was determined at the
hearing that the only issue involved a change in state or federal law. Curtis v.
Page, No. TCA 78-732 (ND. Fla. Apr. 13, 1978).
124. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (a) (6) (i) (A) (1979).
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sion on the merits is favorable to the recipient, the recipient's
benefits will be reinstated and corrective payments will be
made retroactively.125
The peculiar regulation that requires a decision on the
merits and yet permits the discontinuation of assistance midway through the appeals process is the result of an amalgamation of HEW's policy that welfare benefits should not be
continued pending an appeal unless the case raises issues of
fact or judgment12 6 and the determination of the federal courts
that the distinction between questions of fact or judgment and
issues of law or policy is not likely to be accurate if it is made
administratively, prior to the welfare hearing.127 From the beginning, HEW's requirement that benefits continue pending an
appeal has been mandatory only in cases in which the recipient's appeal raises an issue of fact or judgment. 28 HEW, therefore, must have believed that the reasons for continuing
benefits did not apply to cases in which only issues of law or
policy were involved. What are the reasons for continuing welfare benefits, despite an administrative determination of ineligibility, until a decision is rendered after a hearing?
The rationale for such a policy is the same one that the
Supreme Court used to support its holding in Goldberg v.
Kelly,129 that due process requires a pre-termination hearing,
since without it, an eligible recipient may be improperly deprived of essential food, clothing, and shelter. There is, in other
words, both skepticism about the accuracy of administrative
determinations of ineligibility and a belief that the hearing procedure is an effective mechanism for correcting administrative
error. HEW's decision not to require a hearing prior to benefit
termination in cases involving only issues of law and policy
must therefore rest on an assumption that there is a significantly higher degree of accuracy for administrative determinations based on law and policy than for determinations based on
fact, or that even if errors of law are frequent, the hearing
mechanism is not an appropriate means of correcting them. It
is unlikely that HEW believes that hearings are inappropriate
to resolve issues of law or policy, because it has mandated that
125. Id. § 205.10(a)(18).
126. 38 Fed. Reg. 22,005, 22,006 (1973).
127. See notes 81-91 supra and accompanying text.
128. The first public expression by HEW of a policy that benefits should be
continued until the appeal was decided limited such continuation to cases "involving an issue of fact, or of judgment relating to the individual case." 33 Fed.
Reg. 17,853, 17,854 (1968).
129. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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states provide hearings for such cases. The rationale for restricting prior hearings to cases in which law or policy are not
solely at issue must therefore be the assumption that errors of
law are less frequent than errors of fact or judgment.
The validity of the assumption that.administrative errors of
law are less frequent than errors of fact is central to the deternination of whether the regulation is consistent with provisions of the Social Security Act. Part VI of this Article reports
the results of an empirical study of welfare hearings which suggests that welfare agencies are as likely to make erroneous de30
cisions on questions of law as they are on questions of fact.1
Furthermore, the regulation causes potential problems with at
least one or the other of two relevant provisions of the Social
Security Act. Even if HEW is correct that errors of law are relatively infrequent, nevertheless allowing questions of law to be
distinguished from questions of fact by a hearing officer who is
not supplied with guidance for making the distinction may violate the statutory requirement that programs be uniformly administered throughout a state. If HEW is incorrect and errors
of law are as common as errors of fact, HEW may have a statutory obligation to continue benefits in cases raising issues of
law, as well as in cases raising issues of fact, until the appeal
has been decided on the merits. This obligation would arise
from the mandate that aid be furnished to all eligible individuals.
A.

THE STATEWIDENESS REQUMREMENT

For the purpose of assessing the validity of the regulation
under the statutory statewideness requirement, it will be assumed that HEW is correct in assuming that legal errors are
less frequent than factual errors. If the line between insignificant and significant error rates is the line between cases of law
or policy and all other types of cases, HEW must write a regulation that allows the states, with relative accuracy, to draw the
line between the two categories of cases in order to effectuate a
policy of limiting the continuation of benefits to cases in which
there is a significant likelihood of error. The history of HEW's
efforts to establish clear definitions and the history of states' attempts to apply the fact-law distinction to actual appeals overwhelmingly demonstrate that the distinction is neither easily
defined nor easily applied. After years of struggling with alter130.

See notes 217-263 infra and accompanying text.
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native definitions of categories,131 HEW abandoned the effort in
1973132 so that today literally hundreds of state and local hearing officers are free to make the determination without guidance from either HEW or the state agencies.133 The result is a
lack of consistency in the circumstances under which welfare
34
benefits are continued, both between and within states.
The vesting of discretion in state and local hearing officers
to identify the presence of issues of law without federal guidelines or a requirement that states articulate their own guidelines may violate those provisions of the Social Security Act
requiring that the AFDC program in each state be administered
uniformly throughout the state. 35 Statewide uniformity was
mandated to alleviate problems that were evident when, prior
to the 1935 Social Security Act, public assistance was largely
financed and administered by localities. The enormous discretion vested in local officials resulted in serious inequities in the
36
treatment of families in similar circumstances.1
HEW has implemented the congressional desire for statewide uniformity through a regulation which requires that state
programs operate "on a statewide basis in accordance with
equitable standards for assistance and administration that are
131. See, e.g., notes 66-67, 87-90 supra and accompanying text.
132. See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra. The Fair Hearing Guides,
supra note 57, which contained the definitions of categories, was revoked in its
entirety in 1974. Commissioner, Assistance Payments Administration, Social

and Rehabilitation Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Program Instruction APA-PI-75-5 (Aug. 27, 1974).
133. See notes 103-104, 107 supra and accompanying text.
134. One might wonder whether the problem of accurate categorization at
the hearing could be entirely resolved by the provision of detailed definitions of
the categories of issues raised by welfare appeals. A list of detailed category
definitions was prepared for use in the study of welfare appeals from which
data is reported later in this Article. See Appendix, infra p. 1178. In the course
of the study, that list of category definitions could be used successfully to identify issues in welfare appeals when applied to files that included the hearing
officer's decision. Usually the hearing officer's decision was the only document
in the file that would assist in issue identification. Hearing officers' decisions
are only prepared following the hearing and subsequent to an opportunity to
consult legal references and carefully consider the issues in the process of writing a decision. It is far less likely that a list of detailed category definitions
would yield comparably accurate categorizations of issues raised by appeals if
it were applied only to the information available at the time of the hearing.
135. The Act requires that state AFDC programs must be "in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory
upon them." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1) (1976). The Act further requires that the
states either designate a single state agency to administer the program or provide for a single state agency to supervise the program's administration. Id
§ 602(a) (3).
136. See authorities cited in Boddie v. Wyman, 434 F.2d 1207, 1210 (2d Cir.
1970), affid mem. 402 U.S. 991 (1971).
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mandatory throughout the State."' 3 7 HEW has traditionally interpreted the statutory and regulatory statewideness requirements to give it authority to prevent states from vesting
decisionmaking authority in local officals without the provision
of state standards, reasoning that such discretion, without
clearly articulated standards for its exercise, would result in
unequal treatment within a state. For example, in recent years
HEW has asserted that a provision of the Minnesota state
AFDC plan allowing counties to waive the amount of equity
that a recipient has in a home above the amount normally allowed violates the federal statewideness requirement because
it vests authority in the counties without adequate criteria for
the granting of waivers. 38
The statutory mandate of statewideness, viewed in the context of the HEW interpretation that statewideness requirements preclude the vesting of discretion without standards,
may be violated by the practice under current federal regulations that allows hearing officers to make the determination of
whether a case raises an issue of law, as opposed to an issue of
fact, in the absence of state or federal definitions of those categories of issues. Efforts by hearing officers to make such a diffi137. 45 C.FR. § 205.120(a) (1) (1979).
138. Until recently, Minnesota provided an explicit monetary limit for the
amount of equity that a recipient could have in a home and still maintain
AFDC eligibility, but it also sought to allow counties to waive excess equity in
individual cases. HEW objected to the granting of waiver authority to counties
without the provision of any standards, although it did not object to excess equity waivers per se. In response to the concerns expressed by HEW, the Minnesota statute was amended to read that "real estate used as a home in excess
of [the specified] amount will not be a bar to eligibility where the county welfare board determines that such real estate is not available for support of the
family or the sale of such real estate would cause undue hardship." Act of
STAT.
June 8, 1977, ch. 448, § 5, 1977 Minn. Laws 1315 (codified at Mm.
§ 256.73(a) (1) (1978)). Despite these guidelines, the federal agency still maintained that the equity waiver provisions in Minnesota violated the statewideness requirement Letter from Barbara T. Stromer, Assistant Commissioner,
Support Services Bureau, Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, to Professor Laura Cooper (Oct. 2, 1979) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review). See
also Letter from Paul E. Webb, Regional Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Region V, to Professor Laura Cooper (Oct. 18, 1979) (on file with
the Minnesota Law Review). The Minnesota limitation on equity in homesteads was recently eliminated. Act of April 24, 1980, ch. 614, § 130, 1980 Minn.
Laws (amending MiNN. STAT. § 256.73 (1978)). The Minnesota Department of
Public Welfare favored the statutory amendment to place no limitation on the
equity that a person could have in a home while retaining welfare eligibility. In
the view of the state Income Maintenance Bureau, the continuing dispute with
the federal government regarding conformity with the statewideness requirement was a significant reason for elimination of the equity limit. Telephone
conversation with Mr. Kevin Kenney, Director of Policy Analysis and Planning,
Minnesota Department of Public Welfare (May 30, 1980).
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cult decision without any guidelines undoubtedly result in
disparate treatment within a state of recipients raising identical
issues in their appeals. Since the HEW regulation that grants
discretion for predecision discontinuation of assistance must
inevitably produce inconsistent administration within states,
the federal regulation appears to violate the statewideness requirement of the Social Security Act.

B.

STATUTORY MANDATE FOR THE ACCURATE PAYMENT OF

BENEFITS

The regulation authorizing predecision discontinuation of
assistance for welfare recipients seeking administrative review
of questions of law may violate the Social Security Act in another respect. If HEW is incorrect in its assumption that bureaucratic errors of law are less frequent than errors of fact, the
regulation may run afoul of a recent Supreme Court decision
holding that the statutory mandate of accurate payment of governmental benefits may require continuation of benefits until a
hearing decision if, in the absence of a prior hearing, there is
an undue risk of erroneous deprivation. The empirical evidence presented in Part VI of this Article suggests that, in the
AFDC program, agency errors on questions of law are as common as errors of fact or judgment. 139 If that is true, the Social
Security Act provision requiring that AFDC benefits be paid
with reasonable promptness to all eligible individualsl40 may
mandate that, before any AFDC benefits are terminated, the
welfare agency provide the affected recipients with a decision
rendered by an impartial person after a hearing, whether the
issue raised is one of law or fact.
The notion that a right to prior hearings may be inferred
from a statutory requirement of accurate payment of benefits
was first suggested in Califano v. Yamasaki.141 In that case,
the issue was whether the government could recoup Social Security overpayments by decreasing future payments, without
first providing the recipients an opportunity to demonstrate at
an oral hearing that they are entitled to have the overpayment
waived. The Social Security Act's waiver provision mandates
that "there shall be no adjustment of payments to, or recovery
by the United States from, any person who is without fault if
such adjustment or recovery would defeat the purpose of this
139.
140.
141.

See notes 242-243 infra and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (4) (1976).
442 U.S. 682 (1979).
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subchapter or would be against equity and good conscience."14 2
In the two cases consolidated in Yamasaki, the plaintiffs
alleged that the commencement of recoupment without prior
opportunity to demonstrate an entitlement to waiver violated
the Social Security Act and the due process clause. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decisions
without specifically addressing the statutory claims, holding
that the prehearing recoupment procedures were unconstitutional.143 The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach
the due process issue, 44 stating that it was "willing to assume
a congressional solicitude for fair procedure, absent explicit
45
statutory language to the contrary."
The language of the waiver provision quoted above seems
to have no direct bearing on the nature of the procedures required for determining waiver eligibility. The Supreme Court
has nevertheless construed the statute as mandating a prerecoupment oral hearing for any recipient who requests an
overpayment waiver, asserting that accuracy is mandated by
the statutory provision that "there shall be no" recovery when
waiver is proper. The Court suggested that the existence of a
statutory mandate to make accurate determinations of eligibility could be ascertained merely by examining whether the statutory language directing the administrative agency to make an
eligibility decision was mandatory rather than permissive. 14 6
Congress, however, was very likely unaware that its choice between the words "shall" or "may" in sections of the statute not
dealing with administrative procedures would determine
whether program beneficiaries would be afforded hearings
prior to benefit termination or reduction. Yamasaki allows decisions on important questions of administrative procedure to
turn on the presence or absence of magical words, wholly di142. 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1976). Recoupment is considered to be without fault
if the recipient neither knew nor should have known that the overpayment or
the information on which it was based was incorrect. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.507(a)
(1979). Recoupment is considered to defeat the purpose of the program if it
would "deprive a person of income required for ordinary and necessary living
expenses." Id. § 404.508. Recoupment is against equity and good conscience if
the recipient has relied to his financial detriment upon the incorrect payment.
See i&d§ 404.509.
143. The district court and court of appeals decisions for each of the cases
were consolidated in Yamasaki. See 442 U.S. at 687-92.
144. The Court relied on the familiar doctrine that unnecessary constitutional decisionmaking should be avoided when a statutory dispute can be resolved irrespective of the constitutional question. Id. at 692-93.
145. Id. at 693.
146. Id. at 692-94 & n.9.
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vorced from considerations of actual legislative intent or the
demands of fairness in the particular administrative context.
Once the presence of mandatory statutory language is
found, satisfying the first part of the Yamasaki test, the inquiry
turns to the type of procedures required to ensure reasonably
accurate determinations by the administrative agency. To assess the accuracy of waiver decisions made in the absence of
prior hearings, the Court examined the rate of reversal following waiver hearings conducted by the Social Security Administration in response to the district court injunctions issued in
the consolidated cases. In 1977, there were approximately 2000
waiver cases in which recipients were afforded a short personal
conference with an impartial agency employee and an opportunity to present testimony, offer evidence, and cross-examine
witnesses. In thirty percent of these cases, the agency's initial
decision against waiver was reversed.147 Concluding that the
agency might misjudge cases that could have been assessed
properly at a hearing, the Court held that the statutory requirement to make accurate waiver decisions could only be satisfied
by the provision of a pre-recoupment hearing to any recipient
who requests a waiver.148
In determining that pre-recoupment hearings were statutorily mandated for recipients who request waivers, the Court
distinguished such cases from those in which recipients dispute only whether an overpayment occurred. The court stated
that overpayment cases in which there are no allegations of entitlement to waiver involve "relatively straightforward matters
of computation for which written review is ordinarily an adequate means to correct prior mistakes."149 Under the Court's
analysis, even if a statute requires a proper determination of
entitlement to benefits, the procedures afforded need not ensure absolute accuracy in every case, but must allow "some leeway for practical administration."150 The Court assumed that
resolution of overpayment issues generally does not involve a
determination of credibility and therefore concluded that an office review of beneficiaries' written submissions would be adequate to resolve most overpayment disputes.151
147. Id. at 697.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 696.
150. Id.
151. Id. Although elsewhere in its opinion the Court suggested that the risk
of erroneous deprivation is properly measured by empirical evidence, id. at 697,
the Court here failed to require evidence of whether decisions on overpayment
issues would have a reversal rate comparable to that of waiver cases in hear-
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In summary, Yamasaki has created a new test for assessing the fairness of administrative hearing procedures that may
be used to supplant the traditional due process analysis of entitlement to prior hearings. The test's focus on risk of erroneous
deprivation is essentially the same analysis the Court has used
52
to resolve due process challenges to hearing procedures.1
The switch from constitutional to statutory analysis appears intended to allow the Court greater flexibility in choosing when
to invalidate administrative procedures. By allowing its assessment of procedural fairness to depend, in part, on judicial interpretation of unrevealing legislative language, the Court can
make ad hoc assessments which it need not follow in subsequent cases presenting analogous facts.
From the view of a critic of the Court, Yamasaki is an invitation to arbitrary judicial decisionmaking, free from the constraints of stare decisis. For potential plaintiffs, however,
Yamasaki is an invitation to pose constitutional claims as statutory arguments in the hope that courts, once freed from the
constraints of constitutional decisionmaking, will be more willing to require additional administrative procedures. For example, in assessing the validity of the HEW regulation that
permits state welfare agencies to terminate AFDC benefits
prior to a hearing decision if the case raises no factual issues,
the statutory approach of Yamasaki may be used as an alternative to due process analysis. To apply this new analysis to the
AFDC issue, one must examine both the language of the Social
Security Act that governs the AFDC program, and the reversal
rate in hearings on questions of law.
No provision of the Social Security Act explicitly requires
that AFDC benefits be maintained, despite an initial agency determination of ineligibility, until a decision has been rendered
after a hearing. There is, however, a provision in the Act that
may be viewed as a statutory mandate to make accurate payments of AFDC benefits. Section 402(a) (10) of the Social Security Act provides that AFDC "aid... shall... be furnished
ings afforded subsequent to the review of the written file. The Court assumed
that the test of whether a prior hearing may significantly improve the accuracy
of the decisionmaking process is simply whether credibility disputes are present. Although such an assumption may prove correct in the context of Social
Security overpayment decisions, once the Court has established an empirical
test as the basis to assess a risk of erroneous deprivation, it was inappropriate
to settle for an assumption about the degree of risk in a particular category of

cases.
152.

See notes 159-216 infra and accompanying text.
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with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." 5 3 The
"shall be furnished" language in this statute is of the same
mandatory nature as the "shall be no recovery" language that

appears in the Social Security program's statute. 5 4 The AFDC

statute thus appears to satisfy the first part of the Yamasaki
test and would therefore require welfare agencies to make reasonably accurate determinations of eligibility.
The Supreme Court in Yamasaki considered the appropriate test of whether office reviews achieve reasonable accuracy
to be whether hearings subsequent to such reviews often resulted in reversal of the initial decision, concluding that a reversal rate of 30% was sufficient to require a prior hearing. A
study conducted of Minnesota AFDC hearings found that the
reversal rate following hearings on questions of law was

61.7%.155 This high rate of reversal suggests that the Social Security Act provision requiring the payment of assistance to all
eligible individuals requires that AFDC benefits be continued
until after a hearing decision, even when the only issue raised

by the recipient's appeal is a question of law.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1976).
154. One possible issue that arises is whether the allowance for furnishing
assistance "with reasonable promptness" would mean that, even if hearings
would significantly improve administrative accuracy, the statute would permit
an interruption of assistance during the time the appeal is pending for decision
before a hearing officer. The argument would be that even if assistance were
interrupted pending a hearing, if the aid were resumed following a decision by
the hearing officer, it would still be furnished with rea onable promptness. The
term "reasonable promptness" has been defined by HEW in the context of
describing the time limits within which the state welfare agencies must act on
new applications for assistance. In the federal regulations governing the AFDC
program, HEW provides that decisions are made with reasonable promptness if
they are made within 45 days. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10 (a) (3) (i) (1979). What may be
reasonable for decisions on new applications, however, may not be reasonable
for those who are already dependent on public assistance. Is it reasonable to
interrupt funds that, by definition, satisfy basic needs of a family that is deprived by the absence, unemployment, or incapacity of a parent? The plight of
the welfare recipient in such a situation was well described by Justice Brennan
in Goldberg:
Termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility
may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live
while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding
the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to
seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy.
397 U.S. at 264 (emphasis in original). In view of the effect upon such a family
of any termination of benefits, it does not appear reasonable to interrupt that
assistance for even a 45-day period. The statutory allowance for "reasonable
promptness" thus does not detract from the otherwise mandatory language of
§ 602(a) (10).
155. See Table ]a at p. 1168 infra.
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One possible flaw in this argument arises from the distinction made in Yamasaki that prior hearings are necessary in
waiver determinations because credibility might be at issue,
but are not necessary in cases challenging an agency's determination that an overpayment had occurred. 5 6 Since welfare
hearings on questions of law do not involve issues of credibility, prior hearings would not be required for AFDC cases raising issues of law if credibility were indeed the distinctive
factor. The Court's use of credibility as a distinguishing factor
in Yamasaki, however, was based on an assumption, unsupported by any evidence, that written reviews are adequate to
ensure accuracy in the absence of credibility issues. If the
available empirical evidence shows, as it appears to, that in a
significant number of AFDC cases the agency has misjudged
the applicable law, and that the hearing process can correct
those errors, the absence of credibility issues should not determine the prior hearing issue. It may be that welfare agencies
are capable of developing procedures to improve the accuracy
of legal determinations significantly on the bureaucratic level.
For example, advance review of grant terminations or reductions by a staff attorney or an independent recipient advocate
might be as successful as hearings in correcting legal errors
made by agency employees. If so, the Yamasaki approach
would not require hearings in this category of cases. In the absence of administrative procedures that could be as successful
as hearings in ferreting out errors of law, however, welfare recipients should be entitled to hearings on questions of law
prior to the termination or reduction of their AFDC benefits.
Part IV of this Article has considered two possible bases
for challenging, on statutory grounds, the validity of federal
regulations that permit states to discontinue AFDC assistance
prior to a hearing decision when the only issue raised by the
recipient's appeal is a question of law. Section A suggested
that the statutory statewideness requirement may preclude
hearing officers from making distinctions between cases on the
basis of the issue raised by the appeal in the absence of adequate guidelines for defining issues. 57 Section B suggested
that the statutory requirement for the payment of benefits to
all eligible individuals may mandate prior hearings to ensure
reasonably accurate agency determinations of eligibility.58
156.
157.
158.

See notes 149-151 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 131-138 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 139-155 supra and accompanying text.

1146

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64.1107

Neither statutory base, however, adequately addresses the legality of discontinuing benefits when the recipient raises no
factual issues. The first argument only questions the manner
in which cases are distinguished by issue, and does not address
the more fundamental question whether it is permissible to
make a distinction at all. The second argument rests entirely
on Yamasaki, a case that represents an injudicious attempt to
avoid constitutional issues that should be directly addressed.
Parts V and VI of this Article, therefore, consider whether the
due process clause of the Constitution permits termination of
welfare benefits prior to a hearing decision in cases raising only
issues of law.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR PRIOR
HEARINGS
Current federal regulations permit states to terminate
AFDC benefits prior to a decision on an appeal when the only
issue raised is a question of law. 59 Previous sections of this
Article examined the history of this regulation, its use by the
states, and its statutory validity. This section describes the analytical framework for testing compliance with due process requirements as a prelude to assessing the constitutional validity
of this regulation.

A. THE

ELDRIDGE TEST

In Goldbergv. Kelly,160 the Court held that due process requires an adequate hearing before termination of welfare benefits, at least in cases in which the recipient's appeal involves
factual issues or the application of law to particular facts. 16 1 In
his largely conclusory opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan
suggested that the determination of when a prior hearing is required involves a balancing of the harm to individuals caused
by post-termination proceedings and the harm to the government if termination is delayed. Explicit guidelines for the factors to be balanced, however, were not articulated until the
*Court was faced with the question whether due process requires pre-deprivation hearings outside the narrow context of
welfare benefits.
After a series of decisions that attempted to assess the con159. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (6) (i) (A) (1979).
160. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
161. Id. at 254, 268 n.15. See notes 38-45 supra and accompanying text. The
Court did not define the types of issues that fell into these categories.
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62
stitutional validity of a variety of administrative proceedings,1
the Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge,163 unanimously agreed on a
set of factors to be considered in determining the requirements
of due process. 164 Following a determination by the Social Security Administration that he was unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity, the plaintiff in Eldridge became
eligible for and received disability benefits. After a routine review of his case, the agency determined that his disability had
ceased and notified him that his benefits would be terminated
immediately. Eldridge filed an action in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the procedures that permitted the
termination of his benefits before he had an opportunity for an
administrative hearing on the issue of his disability. The court
found the nature of the issues being considered by the agency
indistinguishable from those in Goldberg, and therefore remanded the case to the Social Security Administration with directions to reinstate Eldridge's benefits and to afford him a
hearing before any subsequent termination.165 The Fourth Cir166
cuit affIrmed on the basis of the district court's opinion.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court restated the general rule
that "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,' 67 and outlined
the three factors that must be considered to determine the dictates of due process in a particular case:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
162. See cases cited in Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus
for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CH. L. REv. 28, 28 n.1 (1976).
163. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
164. Id. at 335. The test appears at text accompanying note 168 infra. The
decision in Eldridge was not unanimous. Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined in a dissent that neither approved nor disapproved of the three-factor
test. Both Justices, however, have since authored opinions in which they used
the Eldridge due process test. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,
100 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 84849 (1977)
(Brennan, J.). Justice Stevens, who did not participate in Eldridge,joined in
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Smith. The Court has continued to cite
the Eldridge due process test as the constitutional standard in its most recent
cases. See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Greenholtz v. Inmates
of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1979).
165. Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520, 524 (W.D. Va. 1973).
166. Eldridge v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
167. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
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that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entl.168

By articulating these factors, the Court suggested that it would
engage in a factual analysis to determine the precise contours
of the particular situation in which the due process issue was
posed. In assessing each factor, however, the Court ultimately
resorted to making unsubstantiated guesses about the nature
of the underlying facts.
The Court began by stating that it would examine the nature of the injury to the disability recipient whose benefits
were terminated prior to a hearing. The Court acknowledged
that although disability benefits, unlike welfare benefits, are
not paid on the basis of need, the degree of deprivation suffered
by the individual is likely to be similar because recipients of
disability benefits are "unable to engage in substantial gainful
activity."'169 The Court also observed that the length of time between cessation of benefits and a final decision after a hearing
would probably exceed one year.o70 Although the Court recognized that the current procedures could impose significant
hardship, it concluded that the disabled worker's need is likely
to be less than that of a welfare recipient because of the disabled worker's possible access to other private resources or to
public assistance.'17 The majority of the Court, however, declined to acknowledge the extent of deprivation actually suffered by the plaintiff,172 nor did the Court cite any evidence to
show that disability recipients as a group actually do have access to private resources or public assistance. The Court did
not appear to be aware that public assistance in many states is
73
available only to those with the most limited liquid assets.1
Thus, a disability recipient whose benefits are suspended might
168. 424 U.S. at 335.
169. Id. at 341.
170. Id. at 342.
171. Id. at 342 & n.27.
172. Justice Brennan's dissent noted that after Eldridge's disability benefits
were terminated, his home was subjected to foreclosure and his family's furniture was repossessed, 'Torcing Eldridge, his wife and their children to sleep in
one bed." Id. at 350.
173. See STAFF OF SUBCOMne. ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOr.C
Comm., 93D CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE, PAPER No. 20, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS: 1975, at 351 (Comm. Print 1974).
General Assistance property limits vary from state to state and often from
county to county. In general, they are the same or more restrictive than requirements of the AFDC program. In Florida, for example, some counties do
not give assistance to persons with any available resources. See OFFICE OF
FAMILY ASSISTANCE, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HEW PuB. No. (SSA) 78-21239, CHARACTERISTICS OF
GENERAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 24 passim (1978).
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be forced to forfeit equity in a home or automobile before becoming eligible for public assistance. To examine the extent of
deprivation for disability recipients, the Court, without reference to any empirical evidence, created an idealized disability
recipient and determined that it would not be intolerable for
him to suffer a suspension of benefits for more than a year.
The Court next considered the reliability of existing pretermination procedures and the probable value of any additional or substitute procedural safeguards. The first step in
evaluating such a procedure, according to the Court, is to identify the issue that the procedures are designed to resolve.17 4 In
Eldridge, the Court identified the relevant issue to be whether
there was a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, 7 5 despite the fact that disability decisions more often
turn upon the effect of a medical condition rather than upon
the existence of the condition itself. 7 6 The Court stated that
this assessment was a "more sharply focused and easily documented decision than the typical determination of welfare entitlement," 7 7 although it cited no evidence in support of this
characterization of the typical welfare appeal. The Court also
stated that in welfare cases "a wide variety of information may
be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking process." 7 8 The
Court cited no authority for this conclusion either. Although it
recognized that veracity might be an issue in some disability
cases, the Court stated that "procedural due process rules are
shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthflnding process
as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare excep7 9
tions."1
Having identified the issue in disability hearings as one
generally involving the existence of medically determinable
facts, the Court concluded that disability recipients, unlike welfare recipients, could adequately mold their arguments to the
issues without oral presentation since they can complete written questionnaires identifying relevant information, submit
documentary information from medical sources, and examine
174.
175.

424 U.S. at 343.
Id.

176. STAFF OF SUBCOMiM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., DIsABIrY INSURANCE-LEGISLATIVE
ISSUE PAPER 17 (Comm. Print 1976), cited in Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due
Process Calculus, supra note 162, at 42 n.52.
177. 424 U.S. at 343.
178. Id. at 343-44.
179. Id. at 344.
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the files the agency relied on in making the disability determinations.180
The Court then attempted to determine whether, despite
these safeguards, the process still yielded inaccurate results.
The Court immediately recognized the difficulty of assessing
the accuracy of an administrative process: should it look at the
percentage of appealed cases that are reversed or at the percentage of error for all denials, including both appealed and
unappealed decisions? Furthermore, if the Court seeks to ascertain the degree of error outside the appeals process, how is
error to be defined and determined? Rather than attempting to
resolve these questions, the Court chose to disregard the statistical evidence, including evidence which showed that the reversal rate on appeal was as high as 58.6%.181 The Court simply
stated that statistics on reversal rates do not adequately reveal
administrative accuracy, because reversals could have resulted
from the introduction of new evidence later in the appeals process. 182 Thus, although the Court in Eldridge had established
administrative accuracy as the central function of due process,
it was willing to decide the case despite the absence of reliable
evidence or even an appropriate standard upon which to test
administrative accuracy in the disability determination process.
The final factor considered by the Eldridge Court was the
public interest. Although this inquiry was labelled by the
Court as a search for the "public interest," the Court's analysis
focused exclusively upon financial costs and omitted discussion
of nonfinancial public interests that might be served by a pretermination proceeding. The Court did not mention the governmental interests earlier noted by Justice Brennan in Goldberg
180. Id. at 345-46. The Court failed to note that procedural safeguards of
this nature are also present in the AFDC appeals process. The Court itself
mandated in Goldberg that notice to recipients detail the reasons for the
proposed termination. 397 U.S. at 267-68. Current federal regulations also require that a termination notice include a statement of the specific regulations
supporting the action. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (4) (i) (B) (1979). Regulations also
guarantee the recipient's right to establish all pertinent facts and circumstances and to advance any arguments without undue interference. Id.
§ 205.10(a) (13) (iv)-(v). Goldberg ensured that the hearing decision would be
based only on information available to the recipient because it required that
the hearing officer's decision be based exclusively on the hearing record. 397
U.S. at 271. The current regulations go further and require that the recipient
shall be given an adequate opportunity to examine the contents of his case file
or documents to be used by the agency at the hearing within a reasonable time
before the hearing, as well as during the hearing. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (13) (i)
(1979).
181. 424 U.S. at 346. But see id. at 346 n.29.
182. Id. at 345-47.
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that would be advanced by prior hearings, such as fostering
dignity among poor people and avoiding the societal malaise
that flows from the frustration and insecurity felt by eligible recipients erroneously deprived of benefits.183 Having restricted
its inquiry to the determination of actual monetary costs, 8 4 the
Court made no attempt to ascertain them and instead merely
speculated about their possible magnitude. The Court assumed

that there would be a larger number of requests for hearings if
recipients knew that benefits would be continued pending the

hearing. Although the Court surmised that in "most cases" this
"attractive option" would be exercised,185 the Court did not
seek to determine whether AFDC recipients who have been entitled to the continuation of their benefits under Goldberg for

the past several years have in "most cases" chosen to request
hearings.186 The evidence, in fact, suggests that appeal rates

since Goldberg remain well under ten percent and probably are
not influenced by the option of continued benefits.187 Further-

more, even if the promise of continued benefits did encourage
appeals, certainly in some of those appeals the recipients
would ultimately prevail. Thus, the only costs that should
enter into the calculation are the cost of providing hearings for
ineligible recipients who would not have appealed but for the
promise of continued benefits and the cost of continued benefits for all ineligibles. The magnitude of these costs would de-

pend upon the number of appeals by recipients ultimately
183. 397 U.S. at 264-65.
184 The Court did note, however, the government's interest in conserving
scarce fiscal and administrative resources. See 424 U.S. at 348.
185. Id. at 347.
186. Although the Court noted in Goldberg that "most terminations are accepted without challenge," 397 U.S. at 265, the Eldridge Court made no reference to that assumption.
187. This is suggested by data showing that the appeal rates for assistance
denials (where no benefits are continued) appear to be higher than for terminations. In a recent study of Wisconsin welfare hearings, the researchers found
that there were appeals from less than 4% of the AFDC terminations in the period 1969-1976 and that for the 1975-1976 period, only 1.8% of the terminations
were appealed. Rates of appeal for applicants denied assistance were as high
as 1OA% in 1974, but in 1975-1976 they dropped to 2.2%. Special Student Project,
Procedural Due Process and the Welfare Recipient: A Statistical Study of
AFDC FairHearings in Wisconsin, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 145, 202 [hereinafter cited
as Wisconsin HearingsProject]. By comparing appeal statistics to the national
total of agency decisions in the categorical assistance programs, Professor
Mashaw concluded that the appeals are taken from about 6% of the denials and
terminations. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical
and LitigationNotes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness,and Timeliness in
the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CoRNELL L REV. 772, 784-85 n.33
(1974).
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found ineligible and the length of time between notice of termination and a hearing decision. As the Supreme Court in
Goldberg observed, the promptness of hearing decisions, and
therefore the length of time for which benefits would have to be
continued, is within the control of the government.188 The Eldridge Court nevertheless did not attempt to calculate the actual costs of pretermination hearings in Social Security
disability cases, concluding only that "experience with the constitutionalizing of governmental procedures suggests that the
ultimate additional cost in terms of money and administrative
burden would not be insubstantial." 8 9 Consistent with the absence of empiricism and specificity in the remainder of its analysis, the Court failed to explain just what "experience" it was
referring to and what the magnitude of the costs had been. The
Court's ultimate conclusion in Eldridge was that, in light of its
analysis of the three relevant factors, due process did not require a pre-termination hearing for recipients of Social Security
disability benefits.190
In sum, the Eldridge three-factor analysis for calculating
the requirements of due process sacrifices the unquantifiable
values of due process, such as human dignity and the appearance of governmental fairness, and limits consideration to values that are theoretically susceptible of more precise ascertainment, such as deprivation, accuracy, and cost. Such a narrowing of the values considered relevant to a determination of
due process might be justified on the ground that the exclusive
use of relatively quantifiable values could result in more predictable and principled constitutional decisionmaking. The
Supreme Court, however, immediately abandoned any effort to
reach those objectives by its willingness in Eldridge to utilize
wholly arbitrary assumptions about the facts underlying each
consideration. The end result is that the Court has sacrificed
important unquantifiable due process values in exchange for a
188. See 397 U.S. at 266. Present regulations governing appeals in state
AFDC programs require that final administrative action must be taken within
90 days from the date of the request for a hearing. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (16)
(1979). Statistics collected by HEW showed that, in 1977, on a nationwide basis,
6.7% of the appeal requests were resolved by hearing decisions in less than one
month; 64.6% in more than one month but less than three months; and 28.7% in
more than three months. Texas, with the fifth largest caseload in the country,
managed to issue decisions in 48.5% of its cases in less than one month. 1979
STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 17 (Table 11).
189. 424 U.S. at 347.
190. Id. at 349.
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seemingly objective analytical structure that can be used to
camouflage subjective, result-oriented decisionmaking.
Commentators have argued that the Supreme Court should
use a broader test for the determination of due process rights
in order to effectuate the unquantifiable values that are generally advanced by due process.19 1 The Eldridge framework,
however, has been endorsed by every member of the Court as
the appropriate test of administrative due process. 92 Since the
Court is unlikely to abandon the Eldridge test in the near future, a more effective approach would be to assume the adoption of its three-factor framework, yet attempt to encourage the
Court to take seriously its own exhortation that due process requires a particularistic study of the facts underlying each of the
factors. Only by doing so can it be determined whether the Eldridge test can yield rewards that might justify the Court's refusal to consider the broader values of due process. It may
even be that an Eldridge analysis, explicitly applied to further
administrative accuracy, will have the ultimate effect of furthering broader due process values. Persons who believe that the
government has considered their cases under procedures
designed to achieve accuracy are likely to believe that their individual interests have been respected. An administrative
agency that produces accurate decisions will provide assurance
to the public that it treats individuals fairly. It is possible,
therefore, that honest application of the Eldridge framework
would not only produce predictable and principled constitutional decisions, but also further due process values such as
human dignity and public belief in the fairness of government
action.

B. APPLYING ELDRIDGE TO PRIOR HEARINGS ON QUESTIONS OF
LAW

The constitutionality of the regulation that allows interrup191. Professor Mashaw has argued that due process issues would be more
appropriately resolved by consideration of whether proposed procedures would
advance individual dignity, equality, and the maintenance of tradition.
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus, supra note 162, at 49-57.
Professor O'Neil has suggested a somewhat longer but largely parallel set of interests as an appropriate framework for due process adjudication: accuracy
and fairness, accountability, visibility and impartiality, consistency and integrity. O'Nefl, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare PriorHearing
Cases, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 161, 184-90. See also Saphire, Specifying Due Process
Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to ProceduralProtection, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 111 (1978); Wisconsin HearingsProject, supra note 187, at 169-70.
192. See note 164 supra.
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tion of assistance to a recipient who raises a question of law apparently has never been directly addressed by the courts. The
cases that have litigated the issue of continuation of assistance
have uniformly involved challenges to grant reduction or termination resulting from a change in state law or policy affecting
broad classes of recipients,193 rather than a challenge to an interpretation of law made in an individual case. 194 Although
several courts have considered, in dicta, the constitutionality of
discontinuing assistance to individuals who raise a question of
law,195 no case has applied the Eldridge criteria to the resolution of this constitutional issue.196 This section examines the
193. E.g., Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1971); Viverto v. Smith, 474 F.
Supp. 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Whitfield v. King, 364 F. Supp. 1296 (M.D. Ala. 1973)
(three-judge district court), arf'd mem., 431 U.S. 910 (1977); Provost v. Betit, 326
F. Supp. 920 (D. Vt. 1971); Merriweather v. Burson, 325 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Ga.
1970), affid in relevant part,439 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1971). Some of these cases
are discussed at note 85 supra.
194. The federal regulations mandate different procedural treatment for
cases involving issues of law in which grant adjustments affect broad classes of
recipients. See notes 119-125 s-upra and accompanying text. Courts have approved the denial of prior hearings in cases involving statewide policy changes
on the basis that the state action is more appropriately tested under the constitutional limits on legislative rather than adjudicative decisions. See cases cited
in note 193 supra,particularly the discussion of the issue in Russo v. Kirby, 453
F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1971).
195. For example, in a case arising prior to promulgation of the current federal regulations, in which the state had terminated assistance to all children residing with stepfathers, the Seventh Circuit held that even if a case presents a
pure issue of law, the recipient must be given an "adequate opportunity for argument" before benefits are terminated. Mothers' & Children's Rights Org. v.
Sterrett, 467 F.2d 797, 800 (7th Cir. 1972). After the promulgation of the federal
regulation allowing the hearing officer to decide whether a case raises solely a
legal question and thereafter to discontinue benefits, a federal district court upheld the regulation even though the issue before the court was limited to a
grant adjustment affecting classes of recipients. Burlingame v. Schmidt, 368 F.
Supp. 429, 433-34 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
196. A recent decision of the Supreme Court suggests that at least a majority of the Court would be prepared to find that different due process protections govern hearings on questions of law, as opposed to questions of fact. The
context in which that suggestion was made, however, provides little guidance
as to how the Court might resolve the constitutionality of the federal welfare
regulation. In Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979), the Court considered the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that mandates suspension of a
driver's license for refusal to take a breath analysis test upon arrest for driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The majority, applying the
standards of Eldridge, held that no prior hearing was required, in part because
of the limited risk of error in determining whether an individual had refused to
take the test. The majority suggested that there was not any factual dispute in
this case and that an evidentiary hearing would be "ill-suited for resolution of
... questions of law." Id. at 15 & n.8. The Court noted that it was unclear
whether the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, from whom the plaintiff sought a presuspension hearing, even had plenary authority to resolve questions of law. Id.
The Court did not address the hypothetical question whether, if the plaintiff
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application of each of the three Eldridge factors to the continuation of assistance for a welfare recipient who raises only an issue of law.
The first factor to be considered is the degree of deprivation encountered by an AFDC recipient whose benefits are discontinued. The Goldberg Court noted that a welfare recipient's
condition differs from that of virtually anyone else whose government benefits are ended because termination of a welfare
recipient's benefits "may deprive an eligible recipient of the
very means by which to live while he waits."197 This characterization is surely an accurate one. A study of the extent to which
federal social welfare programs provide benefits to those who
were poor before the government transfer revealed that, in the
AFDC program, 93.4% of the benefits go to people who would
be poor without them, a significantly higher percentage than
any other cash transfer program.19 8 Furthermore, the degree of
raised only a question of law and if the official had authority to decide legal
questions, a pre-suspension hearing would be required and if so, what procedures would be appropriate to resolve legal disputes. However, the four dissenting justices found that "there was clearly a significant factual dispute in
this case," id. at 23, and reasoned that if only a question of law was in issue,
due process required the provision of procedures that could resolve the legal
dispute. Id. at 27-30.
197. 397 U.S. at 264 (emphasis in original). The Court expressed concern
that discontinuation of benefits places a recipient in a desperate situation in
which the need to satisfy daily subsistence requirements will interfere with the
person's ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy. The Supreme
Court in Eldridge quoted from its characterization of the desperate situation of
the welfare recipient in Goldberg, but concluded that the Social Security disability recipient was likely to be less needy than the welfare recipient. 424 U.S.
at 340-43.
198.

R. PLOTNICK & F. SEKDMORE, PROGRESS AGAINST POVERTY: A REVIEW OF

THE 1964-1974 DECADE 212 (1975). This study of 1972 federal antipoverty expenditures also reported that 57.8% of Social Security benefits and 76.3% of the
federal funds spent on emergency assistance and aid to the aged, blind, and
disabled went to the pre-transfer poor. Id. Of state and local expenditures for
general assistance and aid to the aged, blind, and disabled, 78.1% went to the
pre-transfer poor. Id. at 217. The only state or federal government programs to
provide assistance to a higher percentage of poor people than AFDC were programs providing in-kind goods or services that served far fewer people than
AFDC. Id. at 212-18. Many of these in-kind programs provide benefits that go
beyond basic subsistence needs, such as dental care, education, and job training, so that while they might serve a slightly higher percentage of poor people
than AFDC, the degree of deprivation suffered by those whose in-kind benefits
are discontinued would likely be less than that encountered by AFDC recipients whose benefits are terminated. The combined AFDC and food stamp benefits received by AFDC recipients in 1978 were inadequate to meet the
minimum standards for subsistence, defined by the federal poverty line, in all
states except Hawaii. CENrER ON SocIAL WELFARE PoLIcY AND LAW, TABLE OF
ANNuAL AFDC AND FOOD STAMP BENEFTrS FOR A FAMILY OF FouR wrrT No
OTHER INcoMaE-1978 (March 1979). In thirteen states, combined AFDC and

food stamp benefits were less than 70% of the poverty line. Id. In Mississippi
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deprivation suffered by an AFDC recipient whose benefits are
discontinued prior to a decision on the merits of an appeal will
be the same regardless of the nature of the issue raised by the
appeal. Thus, AFDC recipients, whether raising issues of law
or fact, suffer a greater degree of deprivation when faced with
discontinued benefits than any other beneficiaries of government programs.
The second factor to be considered is the accuracy of bureaucratic decisionmaking and the efficacy of the hearing process to discern and correct bureaucratic error. The Supreme
Court noted in Eldridge that the first step in the evaluation of
the administrative process is to identify the nature of the inquiry in which the agency is engaged.199 If the constitutional
right to due process is to rest, at least in part, upon the evaluation of administrative accuracy, then such an evaluation cannot
be conducted without first identifying the nature of the issues
that the decisionmaking process is required to resolve. However, the constitutional decision and the administrative evaluation upon which it relies are rendered a sham if the Court is
willing to adopt an unsubstantiated assumption about the nature of the issues raised as the foundation upon which its analysis is built. That is just what the Court did, both in Goldberg
and in Eldridge.20 0 If the Court concludes that due process determinations must depend on facts rather than theoretical values, there is no excuse for accepting unverified factual
assumptions when the facts in question are capable of empirical verification. Part VI of this Article demonstrates that the
character of the issues raised by welfare terminations can be
20
empirically verified. 1
Once the nature of the issues raised is identified, it is necessary to determine whether existing administrative procedures are adequate to resolve those issues. To assess the
constitutionality of the federal regulation that denies continued
assistance to persons raising an issue of law,20 2 it is necessary
in 1978, the maximum AFDC benefits for a family of four were $120 a month.
Id.
199. 424 U.S. at 343.
200. The Supreme Court assumed in Goldberg that veracity and credibility
are at issue in many welfare termination proceedings. See notes 177-178 supra
and accompanying text. The Eldridge Court reaffirmed the characterization of
welfare hearing issues that it had made in Goldberg,and suggested that questions of credibility arose in "many" welfare cases, and that such questions were
"typical" of the "generality of cases" arising from welfare appeals. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343-44.
201. See notes 217-245 infra and accompanying text.
202. See note 79 upra.
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to know how well the administrative process, short of a hearing, is able to resolve questions of law. If it is found that the
bureaucracy fails to resolve correctly some significant number
of such issues, it is necessary to know whether hearings can
correct administrative errors of law or whether only judicial
decisionmaking can do so. These issues, too, can be empirically
tested. If recipients who raise issues of law in their appeals frequently receive favorable decisions after hearings, that fact
suggests both that bureaucratic procedures alone are not adequate for the resolution of legal disputes and that hearings can
effectively serve to correct bureaucratic errors. Part VI, therefore, also attempts to ascertain the success rate of welfare re2 03
cipient appeals raising solely an issue of law.
The final factor in the Eldridge due process analysis is the
cost of providing additional protection. Since the current regulations already require the continuation of assistance until the
204
date of the hearing for those who raise solely issues of law,
the only additional cost incurred would be the cost of continuing assistance from the date of hearing to the date of decision.
Ascertainment of the additional cost requires a determination
of (1) the number of hearings that would be requested by those
ultimately found ineligible, (2) the length of time for decisionmaking in which benefits would be continued, and (3) the cost
of providing the hearing itself for ineligible recipients who
would not have appealed but for the promise of additional continued benefits. A precise calculation of costs based on a determination of these factors would be difficult to produce. The
first and third factors require an understanding of the influences that affect a recipient's decision to appeal and the comparative presence of such influences in cases raising legal, as
opposed to factual, issues. Little is known about recipient appeal behavior 2 05 and such an investigation is beyond the scope
of this Article. The second factor is also difficult to ascertain
empirically because its magnitude is largely within the control
of the state. It is possible, however, that this time interval
206
could be minimal or even nonexistent.
203. See notes 246-262 infra and accompanying text.
204. 45 C.F. § 205.10 (a) (6) (i) (A) (1979). Although the cost of the hearing
itself may be greater for hearings on legal questions because of the possible
need for additional research time, these costs are already borne by the current
system that requires provision of a hearing and decision on a question of law,
even if benefits are interrupted.
205. Wisconsin HearingsProject; supra note 187, at 200-04.
206. Recipients are entitled, under the current regulations to a minimum of
ten-days prior notice. 45 C.F. § 205.10(a) (4) (i) (A) (1979). The time between
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These considerations make it impossible to determine with
any certainty the additional costs that would be encountered
by continuing benefits to recipients until a decision is rendered
on the merits of an appeal, regardless of the nature of the issue
raised. There are two sources of information, however, that
may provide some idea of whether these costs would be so
great as to outweigh the other two Eldridge considerations of
deprivation and accuracy. The first of these is the experience
of the states in complying with the holding of Goldbergrequiring maintenance of benefits in cases in which there are factual
controversies. When the states were asked by HEW to substantiate their initial claims that Goldberg would produce intol208
2 07
no data were forthcoming.
erable administrative costs,
Furthermore, the states have not subsequently sought to have
the courts or HEW reconsider the requirement of pre-termination hearings on the ground that the benefits do not outweigh
the financial cost. Thus, the states, who were at first extremely
hostile to pre-termination hearings for fact questions, now appear to find such hearings useful, or at least tolerable. It seems
likely that states would arrive at the same conclusions if they
were constitutionally required to provide pre-termination hearings for legal issues, so long as recipients raising such issues
have a comparable success rate to recipients raising questions
of fact.
More direct evidence of the tolerability of the administrative costs of pre-termination hearings on questions of law is
available from the operation of the AFDC and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI)209 programs. As we have seen, the curnotice and actual termination is likely to exceed ten days because AFDC payments are usually paid monthly and the bureaucratic mechanism for issuing
checks may not be responsive to efforts to effectuate changes begun as few as
ten days before the end of the month. ADMINmSTRATION REPORT, supra note 13,
at 145, 162.
If an adequate number of hearing officers are provided, it should be possible to provide a hearing decision prior to the effective date of all terminations,
so that no benefits would ever be unnecessarily paid to a recipient who would
be found after a hearing to be ineligible. Although the provision of additional
hearing officers would involve increased state personnel costs, these costs
might be recouped from the amount of benefits that would otherwise have been
paid to ineligible recipients pending a hearing decision. If the time between
the effective date of a notice of intent to terminate and the rendering of a hearing officer's decision could, in fact, be reduced to zero and if that fact could be
effectively communicated to welfare recipients, the cost of hearings conducted
for recipients who would not have requested a hearing, but for the promise of
continued assistance, should also approach zero.
207. See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
208. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
209. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1970) (amended 1978).
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rent federal regulations governing the AFDC program permit
the states, if they choose, to continue benefits in all cases regardless of the nature of the issue raised by the appeal.2 10 That
2 11
sugat least twenty-five states continue benefits in all cases,
gests that a substantial number of state welfare administrators
have decided that the benefits of continuing assistance in appeals raising only issues of law outweigh the price of that continued assistance. The administration of the Supplemental
Security Income program suggests a similar cost-benefit conclusion. When the federal government took over the categorical
assistance programs for adults,212 it was under no clear constitutional compulsion to supply pre-termination hearings in
cases other than those raising factual issues. 21 3 Nevertheless,
federal regulations governing the SSI program provide for continuation of benefits in all cases, regardless of the nature of the
issue, until a decision is rendered on the merits of the appeal.2 14 Thus, in a program that is generally similar to AFDC,
HEW appears to have concluded that the provision of continued benefits in cases raising only legal issues outweights the
2 15
costs of benefit continuation.
210. See note 93 supra.
211. See notes 104-105 supra and accompanying text. Although only eighteen states have an explicit policy of continuing benefits in all cases, at least
seven other states follow that policy in practice. Such a defacto inclusive continuation policy may exist in additional states with a contrary formal policy
whose representatives merely failed to volunteer such information in the survey.
212. The SSI program was created in 1974 when Congress federalized the
programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled, which had previously been
administered by the states under federal regulations, exactly as AFDC is administered today.
213. In Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970), decided on the same
day as Goldberg, the Supreme Court held that the requirement of a pre-termination hearing applied to the Old Age Assistance program, one of the predecessors of SSL
214. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1336(b) (1979).
215. One distinction between AFDC hearings and SSI hearings is the possibility that SSI hearings include a larger percentage of hearings on issues of fact
or the application of law to fact than AFDC hearings. Since disability is an eligibility condition for SSI recipients who are neither aged nor blind, one would
expect that a large percentage of SSI hearings would be concerned with the nature of the applicant's medical condition and whether it meets the program's
definition of disability. The author is not aware of any empirical studies on the
nature of issues raised in SSI hearings. About half of SSI recipients qualify for
benefits on the basis of disability, whereas the eligibility of only 7.7% of AFDC
children is based on the incapacity of a parent. STAFF DATA, supra note 10, at
Tables 14, 27. For purposes of cost-benefit analysis, the nature of the issues
raised by the appeals would not be important so long as the recipient success
rates in different kinds of appeals were about the same. Another possibly relevant distinction between the SSI and AFDC programs is their relative size. In
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In sum, although the financial cost of continuing benefits in
all AFDC cases cannot be precisely calculated from available
data, a significant number of state and federal welfare administrators have concluded that the costs of continued benefits,
whatever their magnitude, are outweighed by the advantages of
continuing assistance in all cases. This evidence, together with
the ability of states to reduce, or even eliminate, additional
costs by the prompt rendering of hearing decisions,2 16 demonstrates that cost factors should not preclude prior hearings if it
appears that prior hearings are appropriate for welfare appeals
raising solely issues of law based on the Eldridge factors of
deprivation and accuracy. Since the substantial degree of deprivation suffered by AFDC recipients extends to recipients
whose appeals are based on issues of law, the factor that will
ultimately determine whether due process mandates the provision of prior hearings is accuracy. Part VI of this Article therefore considers evidence of whether current bureaucratic
procedures are adequate to assure correct assessment of legal
issues affecting the provision of welfare benefits and, if not,
whether welfare hearings can be an effective mechanism for
the correction of errors of law.

VI AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE EFFICACY OF
WELFARE HEARINGS ON QUESTIONS OF LAW
Hearings on questions of law can only improve the accuracy of the administrative process if some termination decisions actually are made on questions of law rather than
questions of fact. Therefore, an attempt will be made to assess
the validity of the Supreme Court's assertion that welfare appeals arising from terminations generally concern factual questions in which credibility and veracity are at issue.
If it is found that welfare terminations regularly raise issues of law, it is necessary to determine how well the administrative process, short of a prior hearing, resolves legal
questions and whether a prior hearing could significantly improve the level of accuracy. If recipients who raise issues of
October 1977, there were 10.8 million AFDC recipients in 3.5 million families. In
that month, 4.2 million people received SSI. STAFF DATA, supra note 10, at Table 1. In the AFDC program, the number of families may be a better reflection
of the number of potential hearings than would be the total number of recipients. For purposes of policy-making, these differences in program size and nature of issues raised are probably not as important as the substantial difference
in the political acceptability of the two programs.
216. See note 206 supra and accompanying text.
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law in their appeals frequently receive favorable decisions after
hearings, that would suggest both that bureaucratic procedures
alone are not adequate for the resolution of legal disputes and
that hearings can effectively correct bureaucratic errors.2 17 Ascertainment of the success rate of appeals raising solely issues
of law is therefore vital to a determination of whether due process would require a prior hearing on welfare appeals raising
solely an issue of law. An effort will therefore also be made to
ascertain the success rate of such appeals.
To determine whether welfare appeals actually raise legal,
as opposed to factual, issues and to determine the success rate
of appeals on questions of law, it is necessary to examine the
experience of welfare appeals in a state that continues assistance to all recipients, regardless of the nature of the issue
raised by the appeal, until a hearing decision is rendered.
Since Minnesota is one such state, the experience of welfare
appeals in Minnesota was surveyed.
217. The Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), suggested that it was in somewhat of a quandary over how to determine administrative accuracy and what weight to give to reversal rates of appealed
administrative decisions as a reflection of administrative accuracy. See notes
181-182 supra and accompanying text. In a subsequent case, however, six members of the Court found adequate evidence of administrative error to justify a
pre-termination proceeding on the basis of anecdotal reports of administrative
error and a study in another jurisdiction that errors were identified in 16% of
complaints investigated. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1, 18 n.21 (1978). In a prior hearings case resolved on statutory, as opposed
to constitutional grounds, the Court found that a reversal rate of 30% following
hearings was sufficient to hold that there was an intolerably high risk of error
in bureaucratic decisiorimaking in the absence of hearings. Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 697 (1979). For a full discussion of the case, see notes
141-152 supra and accompanying text. Although success rates in appealed decisions may not be the best method of ascertaining administrative errors of law,
it is the only one readily available. Theoretically, an independent review of
every AFDC file might be conducted to see if any decisions made by
caseworkers were based on erroneous assumptions about the applicable law.
Since the caseworker's determination of eligibility and benefit level in every
case is based on a long list of assumptions about the nature of the applicable
law, an independent review would require legal research into the validity of
each of these assumptions for each file. Although HEW has once again mandated that the states include review of negative case actions (denials and terminations) in their Quality Control programs, the method of review is designed
to reveal errors of fact, not errors of law. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37205 (1977). See
also ADmINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 223-26. In adopting the assumption that recipient success on appeal is indicative of bureaucratic mistakes on
questions of law, one need not be concerned, as the Court was in Eldridge, that
recipient success may instead reflect evidence introduced for the first time in
the appellate proceedings. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 346-47 (1976).
In cases in which solely legal issues (as defined in this 9tudy) are involved, the
outcome of the appeal is not dependent upon an assessment of the individual
facts of the case.
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MINNESOTA WELFARE HEARINGS

The AFDC program in Minnesota is administered by
county welfare agencies 2 18 under the supervision of the state
Department of Public Welfare.21 9 Any person applying for or
receiving AFDC benefits whose application is denied or not
acted upon with reasonable promptness, or whose assistance is
suspended, reduced, or terminated by a local agency, is entitled
to a hearing.2 20 The Commissioner of the Department of Public
Welfare is authorized to appoint state welfare referees and local welfare referees. 22 ' During 1977, the period included in this
study, three of Minnesota's eighty-seven counties chose to have
local welfare hearings. 222 The three counties with local hearings (Anoka, Hennepin, and Ramsey) are all located in the
Twin Cities metropolitan area. In those counties with a local
hearing officer, hearings are conducted by the local officer. A
local welfare agency, applicant, or recipient aggrieved by a ruling of a local hearing officer may appeal to the state agency, in
which case a second hearing is conducted by the state welfare
referee.2 23 In counties without a local hearing officer, the sole
administrative hearing is conducted by a state welfare referee.
After the hearing at the state level, in both initial appeals and
appeals following local hearings, the hearing officer recommends an order to the Commissioner of the Department of
Public Welfare. 22 4 The Commissioner may either accept the
recommended order or advise the parties that he intends to re2 25 When such notice is given, the parfuse to accept the order.X
ties are provided an opportunity to submit written argument
before the Commissioner's final decision is issued.22 6 During
the survey period, refusals of the Commissioner to accept the
recommended order of the state welfare referee were extremely rare. Any party aggrieved by a decision of the Com22 7
missioner may appeal the order to the state district court.
218.
219.
220.

MiNN. STAT. § 256.72(1) (1978).
Id. § 256.01(4)(1).
Id. § 256.045(2) (local hearings); id. § 256.045(3)

(state agency hear-

ings).
221. Id. § 256.045(1).
222. Welfare appeals filed in Hennepin County after September 1, 1978 are
heard by a state appeals referee.
223. MImN. STAT. § 256.045(3) (1978). By stipulation of the parties, the state
hearing may be limited to a review of the record of the local welfare hearing.
Id.
224. Id.
225. Id § 256.045(5).
226. Id.

227. Id. § 256.045(7).
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Review in the district court is generally on the record, although
the court is empowered to hear new or additional evidence if it
2 28
is "necessary for a more equitable disposition of the appeal."
Any party aggrieved by a decision of the district court may appeal the order to the Minnesota Supreme Court.229
Neither the state statute nor the state regulation governing
the AFDC program limits the opportunity for a hearing on the
basis of the nature of the issue raised by the appeal.23 0 Furthermore, regardless of the nature of the issue raised by the appeal, welfare benefits are maintained without alteration until
the appeal is decided through the state or local hearing process
if the recipient's appeal is filed before the agency's intended action is implemented. 231

B.

METHODOLOGY

In order to obtain a representative picture of Minnesota
AFDC appeals, the fies of appeals decided by Hennepin
County hearing officers and those decided by state appeals officers for the eighty-four counties that did not employ a local
hearing officer were reviewed. Hennepin County, in which the
city of Minneapolis is located, was included in order to reflect
the urban experience. The eighty-four counties that comprised
the state hearings review included all counties in the state exclusive of Hennepin County and the other two urban counties
with local hearing officers.2 3 2 These eighty-four counties contain about seventy-seven percent of the AFDC recipients in the
228. Id. § 256.045(8). The district court may reverse or modify the decision
of the agency if it is in violation of constitutional provisions, in excess of the
statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, made upon unlawful procedure, affected by other error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence in
view of the entire record as submitted, or arbitrary or capricious. Id. § 15.0425.
229. Id. § 256.045(9). Minnesota has no intermediate appellate court.
230. Id. § 256.045(9); 12 Minn. Code of Agency Rules § 2.044(F) (2) (1979).
The state manual, which is subordinate to the state regulation and which does
not have the force of law, purports to authorize the agency to deny or dismiss a
request for a hearing "[w]here the only issue is one of state or federal law requiring automatic adjustments for classes of recipients." MMN. DEP'T OF PUBLC WELFARE, AFDC PROGRAM MANUAL, VI-D (1979). With respect to the legal
authority of the manual, see McKee v. Lilins, 261 N.W.2d 566, 576-78 (Minn.
1977); MN. STAT. §§ 15.0411-.0413 (1978); 12 Minn. Code of Agency Rules
§ 2.044(A) (1) (1979).
231. 12 Minn. Code of Agency Rules, § 2.044(F) (2) (d) (1979). The state

manual further provides: "Note: After the local evidentiary officer renders a
decision, continuation of benefits at a previous level shall not be maintained
unless ordered by the local evidentiary officer, even though the client appeals
the ruling to the state." MINN. DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, AFDC PROGRAM
MANUAL, VI-D (1979).

232. See notes 222-223 supra and accompanying text.
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state.233 Review was made of every AFDC appeal file in which
a decision was rendered during the calender year of 1977 for
2
the eighty-five counties. 3
Next a list of descriptions and definitions for the nature of
issues raised by AFDC appeals was established. Several drafts
of descriptions and definitions were prepared and tested with
sample appeal files. The list of welfare appeal issues used in
the study, with definitions and examples, is set out in the appendix. A law student research assistant who had several
years' experience in state welfare administration reviewed
each appeal file within the sample and identified the issue
raised by the appeal, the category of issue into which it fell, the
extent of the recipient's representation, and the outcome of the
appeal. The author rechecked every file and categorization.
For each case, the issue raised was identified by review of all
the documents in the fie. The issue was generally revealed by
the decision of the hearing officer, but in some cases other documents in the file, such as county hearing summaries, corre235
spondence, or exhibits, were relied upon.

233. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, OFFICE OF POLICY, SOCIAL SECURiTY ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS & CASH PAYMENTS BY
STATE AND CouNTY, FEBRUARY 1978, at 95-100 (1979).
234. It was not possible to review appeal files for earlier years because the
state welfare department had destroyed all files of cases docketed prior to 1977.
Access to hearing files was controlled by provisions of the Minnesota Data
Privacy Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 15.162-.1671 (1978 & Supp. 1979), which protects the
confidentiality of information on individuals retained by state and local govern-

ment agencies. The Act permits the dissemination of statistical reports derived
from private or confidential data so long as individuals cannot be identified by
the information released. Id. §§ 15.162(9), .163(7). The Act also authorizes an
administrative agency to delegate to a person outside the agency the power to
prepare summary data, if the person agrees in writing not to disclose private or
confidential data on individuals, and if the agency determines that the person

will not compromise the data. Id. § 15.163(7). In conformity with that provision, the author entered into contracts with the Department of Public Welfare
and the Hennepin County Welfare Department to permit access to appeal files.
235. After repeated discussions in this Article about the difficulty of defining and applying AFDC issue categories, it may seem presumptuous to then attempt to define and apply such categories. The difficulties of definition
encountered by HEW in the course of its policy formation seemed largely to
arise from attempting to classify the variety of appeals into only three categories. The difficulties of application seemed to arise from the absence of clear
definitions and from efforts to make a categorization earlier in the appeals process than the issue could reasonably be expected to be revealed. The methodology utilized in this study for the definition and application of issue categories
was specifically designed to avoid these problems. A large number of discrete
categories were defined and utilized in the categorization process. Categories
were assigned only after the appeals process had been completed and the issues were revealed to the fullest extent that they could be.

C.
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RESULTS

The study found a total of 349 AFDC appeals decided by
hearing officers in calendar year 1977 for the eighty-five Minnesota counties in the sample. Of these, sixty-nine appeals
originating in Hennepin County raised the same legal issue of
whether payments received under the Minnesota Homestead
Credit program must be counted as income in the AFDC program. These cases were brought as individual administrative
appeals because the state district court had refused to certify a
case raising that issue as a class action. The Minnesota
Supreme Court later held that the district court had erred in
failing to certify the case. 236 The state supreme court also reversed the district court's decision on the merits and held that
Homestead Credit payments were not to be considered income
in the AFDC program.2 3 7 Since inclusion of these Hennepin
TABLE I
Issues Raised
State and County Totals Combined
Issue*

Number of

Percent of

Cases

Total

(all subcategories)
A. Interpretation

95+

34.0%+

0

B. Ultra Vires
C. Conflict with State Law
D. Conflict with Federal Law
E. Conflict with State and Federal
Law
F.

11.4%
18.2%
47.5%+

32
51
133 +

L Fact
IL Application
M. Legal Definition

Total

7.9%
2.1%

10

3.5%
0%

0

Unconstitutionality

IV. Protest of Policy
V. Opinion Does Not Reveal Issue

0%

22
6

62
2

22.1%
.7%

280 +

99.9%

*Definitions and examples of issue categories are set out in the appendix.
+Excluded from the total number of cases were 69 Hennepin County appeals
concerning whether payments received under the state's Homestead Credit program were to be counted as income. These cases were brought as separate appeals because the state district court erroneously failed to certify as a class
action a case raising the issue. See Murphy v. Hiniker, 261 N.W.2d 836 (Minn.
1978). If the Homestead Credit appeals were included in the totals, the percentage of cases that raised issues of Legal Definition would be 57.9% and the percentage within the Interpretation subcategory would be 47%.
236. Murphy v. Hiniker, 261 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Minn. 1978).
237. Id. at 840-41.
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County Homestead Credit appeals in the study would distort
the data to overstate both the proportion of legal issues raised
and the recipient success rate on such issues, they were omitted from all the reported data.
Table I sets out the results of the inquiry into the accuracy
of the United States Supreme Court's assumption that welfare
appeals generally concern factual questions in which credibility
and veracity are at issue. The study found that only 11.4% of
the cases reviewed raised questions of fact in which credibility
was at issue. 238 The resolution of another 18.2% of the appeals
depended on the facts of the individual case, but this latter
group was comprised of cases in which the facts themselves
were not in dispute. This "Application" category most commonly involved issues of whether a parent who admittedly
made some visits to the home nevertheless met the statutory
standard for "continued absence from the home" or whether a
parent with undisputed physical ailments met the statutory
standard for "incapacity." Adding together the "Fact" and "Application" categories, we find, contrary to the Supreme Court's
assumption, that less than 30% of the hearing decisions depended on the facts of the individual case for their resolution.
The largest proportion of appeal decisions concerned questions of legal definition in which the hearing officer was asked
to clarify the meaning of language in a statute or regulation.
These "Legal Definition" cases represented 47.5% or nearly half
of all cases reviewed. More than 70% of the legal definition
cases involved interpretation of statutory or regulatory provisions in which there was no claim that the provision conflicted
with a higher legal authority. These interpretive issues ac239
counted for 34% of the total sample.
238. Disputes about credibility were most likely to concern whether fathers
who had been reported to be continuously absent from the family home were
actually living there. Another common factual issue raised in the appeals was
the ownership of real or personal property.
239. Although the difference is not quantifiable, "Legal Definition" appeals
in Hennepin County generally appeared to require a higher level of legal sophistication than the appeals in the outlying areas of the state. For example,
several cases in Hennepin County raised the issue whether a father who qualifies for the unemployed fathers program of AFDC loses eligibility as soon as he
accepts a job that is scheduled to provide him with more than 100 hours of
work, or only upon his actually having worked for 100 hours. The federal regulation defines an unemployed father as one who "[ils employed less than 100
hours a month." 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a) (1) (i) (1979). A legal definition question
that frequently arose in nonurban counties was whether an agency could terminate the assistance of a family that had received a large lump sum settlement,
such as one from a Social Security appeal or personal injury case, even though
all the money had been spent. Federal and state regulations provide that only
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After the legal definition category, the next largest category
of cases, protests of policy, accounted for 22.1% of the cases reviewed. In these protest cases, the recipients did not dispute
the factual findings or the legal conclusions of the welfare
agency rather, they attended the hearing to voice their dissatisfaction with laws or policies that had adversely affected their
receipt of AFDC benefits. Although this group of cases might,
in a technical, legal sense, be labeled frivolous, they were certainly not perceived as such by the recipients. The files of
these appeals generally revealed a strong sense of injustice and
outrage on the part of the recipients. 240 Although the category
"Protest of Policy" included exclusively cases in which the
hearing officer had no power to remedy the recipient's grievance, there did not appear to be any cases in which the recipient had appealed merely in order to ensure a continuation of
welfare assistance. On the contrary, they were cases in which
the recipients used the hearing to communicate very strongly
felt messages to the welfare department.2 41
In summary, Table I reveals that Minnesota welfare apavailable income may be counted. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20(a) (3) (ii) (D), .90(a)
(1979); 12 Minm. Code of Agency Rules § 2.044(D) (12) (b) (1) (1979).
240. The nature of the appeals that were categorized as "Protest of Policy"
is suggested by the following examples. A teenage mother objected to the termination of her welfare benefits for lack of continued absence when she and
the father of her child had decided to live together to try to make a home for
their child. A woman who was working but, in her opinion, not earning enough
to be self-supporting, protested against the termination of her welfare benefits
for excess income. A terminally ill mother whose child had gone to live with
other relatives who were better able to care for the child objected to the welfare department's refusal to make the welfare check payable to her. The welfare department said that the check could not go to the mother because the
child was no longer in her care, although the mother viewed her receipt of the
check as her only remaining source of a sense of responsibility for her child.
Another group of cases that were categorized as protest were cases in
which recipients had been deregistered from the Work Incentive (WIN) Program for noncooperation because they had not understood that the showing of
good cause for failure to cooperate that they wished to make at the welfare
hearing had to have been made at an earlier WIN hearing in order to have been
effective. As a result, recipients who in fact had jobs, or who were in valid
training programs, or who could not work because of the necessity of caring for
invalid family members, came to welfare hearings at which they could do no
more than ineffectively protest against the termination of their benefits.
241. The types of issues that were categorized as "Protest of Policy" are
similar to the appeals that would arise out of challenges to state or federal law
requiring automatic grant adjustments for classes of recipients. Federal regulations allow states to refuse to provide hearings for appeals arising out of automatic grant adjustments. See notes 119-125 supra and accompanying text. In
protest cases, as well as in automatic grant adjustment cases, the nature of the
recipient's grievance appears to belong more in a legislative or rulemaking proceeding than in an adjudicatory setting. In light of the limited resources of welfare recipients, however, the hearing proceeding may be the most effective
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peals only infrequently raise factual issues that involve the
credibility of witnesses and most often raise questions of law
whose resolution does not depend on the particular facts of the
recipient's case.
The next issue addressed in the study was whether administrative hearings on questions of law could improve the accuracy of agency decisions involving the receipt of welfare
benefits. One method of answering this question is to determine the percentage of bureaucratic decisions in cases raising
solely issues of law that are reversed in the hearing process.
The relative utility of the hearing process for correction of legal, as opposed to factual, errors can be ascertained by comparing the recipient success rate on legal issues with success rates
on factual questions. Table II sets out the success rates of clients according to the nature of the issue raised by their appeal
for the sample as a whole.
TABLE II
Client Success Rates by Issue
State and County Totals Combined
Client Lost

Client Won

Issue

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

24

75.0%

8

25.0%

11. Application

25

49.0%

26

51.0%

IM. Legal Definition
A. Interpretation
C. Conflict with
State Law
D. Conflict with Federal Law
E. Conflict with
State and Federal Law

82

IV. Protest of Policy

0

62

100%

V. Opinion Does Not Reveal Issue

0

2

100%

I.

Fact

51

61.7%

38.3%

57

60%

38

40%

18

82%

4

18%

3

50%

3

50%

4

40%

6

60%

Table 11 indicates that clients won seventy-five percent of
the appeals involving solely questions of fact and issues of
credibility. Clients were substantially less successful in cases
of "Application," when the hearing officer's task was to apply a
avenue for communication between recipients and state government on welfare

issues.
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legal standard to the undisputed facts of a particular case. In
the "Application" category, recipients succeeded in only fortynine percent of their appeals.
Since the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly held that
prior hearings were required both in cases labeled here as
"Fact" and as "Application,"242 it is useful to view the consolidated success rate for these two categories of issues. If the
figures for issues of "Fact" and issues of "Application" are combined, clients succeeded in 59% of the cases involving either
the ascertainment of facts or the application of undisputed
facts to a legal standard. In other words, in the types of cases
for which the Supreme Court explicitly mandated provision of
a prior hearing, recipients were successful 59% of the time, a
percentage that is quite close to the success rate of 61.7% for
appeals that raised solely questions of law. The data thus suggest that clients were at least as successful in appealing decisions based on legal conclusions, for which Goldberg did not
in factual
explicitly mandate a prior hearing, as they were
2
cases for which Goldberg required a prior hearing. 43
242. 397 U.S. at 264, 268 n.15.
243. The client success rates in Table H reflect the ultimate outcomes in
those cases. The state hearing files showed that a petition for review of the
hearing decision was filed in the state district court in only 3 of the 280 cases.
The records of the state hearing office and state attorney general suggested
that in none of these cases was a motion made for a hearing in the district
court. In other words, these cases were apparently abandoned at the district
court leveL
Client success rates were initially tabulated separately according to the
level of the hearing decision at which the appeal was resolved: at a state hearing, a local hearing, or a state hearing following an appeal from a local hearing.
The separate tabulation of success rates did not indicate meaningful differences in outcome depending on the level of the hearing that resolved the appeal. For that reason, the data in Table 11 represent the combined totals for the
entire sample.
Recipients appeared to be somewhat more successful in appeals decided
by local hearing officers in Hennepin County than in appeals decided by state
hearing officers in cases involving issues of "Fact" Clients won 15 of 16 "Fact"
cases decided at the local level and 9 of 15 "Fact" cases heard initially at the
state leveL Both the number of "Fact" cases in Hennepin County and the percentage of "Fact" cases in which recipients were successful was somewhat distorted by the fact that about half of the Hennepin County "Fact" cases in which
recipients were successful were the result of clearly erroneous Quality Control
(QC) terminations. In these cases, the county agency had terminated the recipients' benefits upon the recommendation of state QC reviewers on the
ground that the fathers were no longer absent from the home. The only evidence presented in support of the QC decision in each of these cases was an
automobile registration or driver's license of the father that listed the AFDC
family's residence as his address. In each of these cases, the recipient at the
hearing offered a satisfactory explanation for why these documents did not accurately reflect the father's residence. The hearing officer, in each case, ruled
in favor of the recipient. In none of these cases did the county appeal These
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In light of the findings in Tables I and H that a substantial
proportion of welfare appeals involve solely issues of law and
that a substantial proportion of such appeals result in the reversal of the welfare agency's determination, a further inquiry
seemed in order. One might suspect that when welfare appeals
involve questions of law, welfare recipients who are not represented by an attorney would be substantially less likely to succeed. The study indicated, however, that welfare recipients
represented by attorneys generally did not do any better than
recipients without attorneys.24 4 In fact, in some categories of
cases, recipients without any representative or with a nonattorney representative actually fared better than recipients represented by counsel. Thus, the data support the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Goldberg that a welfare recipient need
not be represented by an attorney in the required hearing in
245
order to satisfy due process.
cases thus do not seem to represent disputes between the recipient and the
county agency about the recipient's eligibility, but rather instances in which an
innocent recipient was being used as a pawn in a dispute between the county
and the state QC reviewers.
Recipients also seemed to win somewhat less often in "Legal Definition"
cases that were appealed to the state following a local hearing than in such
cases decided solely by either a state or a county hearing officer. This comparison is not surprising in light of the expectation that "Legal Definition" cases for
which a second administrative appeal is requested are most likely to be close
questions of statutory or regulatory interpretation.
244. A recent study of Wisconsin AFDC appeals also found that attorneys
have only a marginal effect upon the outcome of hearings. That study reported
that of cases disposed of by hearing, clients represented by an attorney were
successful 48.31% of the time and clients without representation were successful 44.53% of the time. Wisconsin Hearings Projec, supra note 187, at 205-09,
Table 6 at 207. It might be fruitful for further research to explore success rates
for clients represented by attorneys by comparing success rates for attorneys
who are welfare specialists with success rates for attorneys who have little or
no experience in handling welfare appeals. The data collected here does not
permit such a comparison, but a review of the files suggested that there were
wide differences in the quality of representation that clients received from their
attorneys. In areas of the state outside the Twin Cities, attorneys appearing at
welfare hearings were frequently private attorneys whose presence at the hearing appeared to be an extension of efforts to preserve assets obtained for the
client in a divorce or personal injury case. In such cases, there was usually
nothing in the welfare hearing file or the hearing decision indicating that the
attorney had made any legal arguments to the hearing officer. In the Hennepin
County appeals, however, attorney representation usually meant representation by a welfare specialist from either the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis or
the University of Minnesota Welfare Law Clinic. The files of many of these
cases contained extensive legal memoranda submitted by the recipient's attorney, and the hearing officer's opinion in these cases made frequent reference to
legal arguments made by the recipient's attorney.
245. 397 U.S. at 270 ("We do not say that counsel must be provided at the
pre-termination hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain
an attorney if he so desires.").
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TABLE III
Client Success Rates by Issue and Nature of Representation
State and County Totals Combined
Issue

Client Lost

Client Won

Representation

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

Attorney
No Representative
Non-attorney#

7
14
3

70.0%
73.7%
100.0%

3
5
0

30.0%
26.3%
0 %

II. Application Attorney
No Representative
Non-attorney

7
14
4

58.3%
42.4%
66.7%

5
19
2

41.7%
57.6%
33.3%

M. Legal
Definition+

Attorney
No Representative
Non-attorney

26
48
8

65.0%
61.5%
53.3%

14
30
7

35.0%
38.5%
46.7%

IV. Protest
of Policy

Attorney
No Representative
Non-attorney

0
0
0

0 %
0 %
0 %

4
52
6

100 %
100 %
100 %

Attorney
V. Opinion
No Representative
Does Not
Reveal Issue Non-attorney

0
0
0

0 %
0 %
0 %

1
0
1

100 %
0 %
100 %

L

Fact

+The "Legal Definition" category here consolidates the legal definition subcategories used in Tables I and H.
#Non-attorney representatives included lay advocates employed by legal services
offices, county welfare departments, and social service agencies as well as professional social workers.

Table III compares client success rates for each category of
issue according to the nature of the client's representation.
The only category of appeals in which clients represented by
attorneys did substantially better than clients who were either
not represented or represented by a nonattorney was the "Application" category. If the figures for clients represented by a
nonattorney and those without any representative are combined, we find that clients without an attorney prevailed 46.2%
of the time in "Application" cases, whereas clients represented
by an attorney in this issue category prevailed 58.3% of the
time. In the "Legal Definition" category in which one might expect that attorneys would have the greatest impact on client
success rates, the presence of an attorney actually seems to
have had little effect. In the "Legal Definition" category, clients
with an attorney prevailed 65.0% of the time, while clients without an attorney prevailed 60.2% of the time.
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D. SUMMARY
The study of AFDC appeals in Minnesota was designed to
seek answers to two questions vital to the determination of
whether the due process clause requires the maintenance of
welfare benefits until a decision after a hearing in which the
only issue raised by the recipient's appeal is a question of law.
Consistent with the Supreme Court's analytical structure established in Mathews v. Eldridge,246 the study sought to ascertain (1) the nature of the issues raised by welfare appeals, and
(2) whether the administrative hearing process was an appropriate mechanism for correcting erroneous determinations of a
welfare agency on questions of law. The results suggest that,
contrary to the Supreme Court's assumption, a large proportion
of welfare appeals involve questions of law rather than questions of fact. The results also suggest that, even if attorneys are
not present, the welfare hearing process can be an effective
mechanism for correcting the bureaucracy's incorrect legal interpretations that otherwise would have resulted in the improper termination of welfare assistance. When these facts
concerning administrative accuracy are considered in conjunction with the degree of deprivation encountered by AFDC
recipients erroneously deprived of their benefits and the potentially limited additional costs of providing prior hearings, 247 the
resulting balance of interests for prior hearings on questions of
law becomes identical to that in Goldberg v. Kelly.248 So long
as the Supreme Court continues to reaffirm its Goldberg holding, the conclusion seems inescapable that due process requires the maintenance of AFDC benefits until a decision
following a hearing, even if the only issue raised by the recipi2 49
ent's appeal is a question of law.
246. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
247. See notes 197-215 supra and accompanying text.
248. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
249. To say that Eldridge requires prior hearings for recipients raising
questions of law as well as questions of fact is not to say that due process
would compel a prior hearing in all welfare appeals. The study suggested that
in approximately one-fifth of the cases, those in the "Protest of Policy" category, the recipient had no likelihood of success on the merits and therefore no
constitutional right to a prior hearing. On a theoretical level, one might wish to
screen cases prior to the hearing to ascertain if the case were merely a "Protest
of Policy" and if so, to discontinue benefits prior to the hearing. The decisions
of the district court and the Supreme Court in Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F.
Supp. 996, 999-1000 (N.D. Cal.), affd mem. sub nom. Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412
U.S. 924 (1973), however, demonstrate that pre-hearing determinations of the
nature of issues raised by welfare appeals are too often incorrect and that the
benefits of recipients constitutionally entitled to continued benefits are thus incorrectly terminated. On a practical level, therefore, it may be necessary to

1980]

GOLDBERG'S FORGOTTEN FOOTNOTE

1173

The fact that welfare appeals today include a large proportion of cases raising solely issues of law does not necessarily
mean that in 1970 the Supreme Court was wrong in assuming
that welfare appeals raised largely factual issues in which credibility played a substantial part. The categorization of issues as
factual or legal does not necessarily remain constant over time.
As a body of law matures, questions that were earlier viewed
as questions of fact or application can be rephrased as questions of law. For example, one of the appeals consolidated in
Goldberg concerned whether a woman had to cooperate in obtaining child support payments as a condition of her AFDC eligibility.2 50 Although the issue might then have been a question
of fact or application over which the welfare agency had considerable discretion, today this issue is controlled by federal stat252
ute 25 ' and a substantial body of detailed federal regulations.
Similarly, questions about whether a parent is required to work
in order to be eligible for AFDC and the circumstances under
which offered employment may be justifiably refused, questions which previously were a matter of discretion for local welfare offices,253 are now defined by federal statutes 25 and
regulations. 255 Thus questions of cooperation in child support
and work requirements, which were only recently raised as
questions of fact or application, are more likely today to arise
as questions of law.
The substance of welfare law has grown dramatically over
the last ten years through Supreme Court and lower court
cases, amendments to the Social Security Act, and the promulgation of comprehensive federal regulations. Some of those
regulations have mandated that states adopt written policies
and make them available to the public.256 Even Goldberg itself
continue benefits in all cases at least until the hearing, at which time the hearing officers may be able to make a more accurate assessment of the nature of
the issue. At the time of the hearing, the hearing officer could direct the discontinuation of assistance for recipients whose cases raised neither an issue of
law nor an issue of fact.
250. See note 41 supra.
251. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (26) (B) (1976).
252. 45 C.F.R. § 232.12 (1979) (cooperation); id. §§ 232.13, .40-.49 (establishment of good cause for noncooperation).

253. See A. KErrH-LucAs, supra note 26, at 218; HANDBOOK, supra note 26,
§ 3401.1 (1946).
254. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (19), 630, 632, 633 (1976).
255. 45 C.F.R. §§ 224.0-.77 (1979).
256. Federal regulations mandate that state agencies issue uniform rules,
provide methods for making staff aware of state policies, and make program
manuals and other policy issuances accessible to the public. Id. §§ 205.70, .100,
.120.
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has contributed to the growth of the law by requiring of hearing
officers written decisions that state the reasons for their conclu257
sions.
Once it is established that due process entitles welfare recipients raising issues of law to a hearing prior to the termination of their benefits, it must be determined just what kind of
hearing should be provided. The Supreme Court in Goldberg
specified the procedures to be afforded welfare recipients challenging terminations involving misperception or misapplication
of facts. 25 8 These procedures include the right to present evidence, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to
be represented by an attorney. The Court, however, did not require that counsel be provided for recipients, nor did it insist
that hearing officers have training in the law.259 Initially it
might seem that the presence of an attorney might be necessary in a hearing involving legal issues, but that the other procedural dictates of Goldberg would be wholly inappropriate for
hearings in which there was no necessity to introduce evidence
or to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Nevertheless, the Minnesota experience suggests that the hearing procedures designed in Goldberg for the resolution of factual
disputes are well suited to accurate resolution of purely legal
issues.
The Minnesota hearings on questions of law permit welfare
recipients to introduce evidence and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. It is also common for the hearing officer to participate in the questioning of witnesses for both
sides. This free exchange of information between the parties
might be necessary in hearings on questions of law in order to
identify the underlying legal issue and the facts which then become relevant to its resolution. Welfare recipients generally
have no understanding of the legal basis for the agency's action, even if they have received from the county a summary of
issues that includes citations to provisions of the state welfare
manual. Furthermore, the welfare caseworker, who is often the
sole representative for the county at a hearing, is unlikely to be
familiar with state or federal statutes and regulations. Usually
a caseworker relies exclusively on the welfare manual, a written policy interpretation, or a supervisor's instruction, none of
257. See 397 U.S. at 271. Federal regulations provide that, subject to provisions for safeguarding confidential information, all state agency hearing decisions must be accessible to the public. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (a) (19) (1979).
258. See 397 U.S. at 266-71.
259. Id.
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which has the force of law.260 Finally, neither the caseworker
nor the recipient may have a clear idea of what facts are relevant. Under such circumstances, even if there are no facts in
dispute, a hearing officer may need access to accurate factual
information from both sides in order to identify and resolve the
underlying legal issue.
The Minnesota evidence outlined in Table I suggests that
the lack of legally trained advocates or the presence of a hearing officer who is not an attorney does not preclude an accurate
legal determination. The hearing decisions reviewed in this
study were the product of five different hearing officers, none of
whom was an attorney.261 The hearing officers did, however,
have a substantial familiarity with the hierarchy of welfare
statutes and regulations both from their experience as full-time
welfare hearing officers and from their backgrounds as bureaucrats in the state and county welfare departments. This suggests that although a formal legal education should not be a
prerequisite for hearing officers, it may be necessary for them
to have some background or training in the identification of
sources of welfare law and the methods by which they are interpreted.
The surprising conclusion seems to be that if welfare departments are constitutionally required to provide hearings on
appeals raising solely legal issues, the procedures at those
hearings need not differ from those utilized in hearings on
questions of fact. This conclusion should ease the administrative burden of providing hearings on questions of law. The
Supreme Court has previously affirmed that accurate distinctions betwen questions of fact and questions of law can be
made no earlier than at the administrative hearing. 262 If welfare departments were required to provide different procedures, different hearing officers, and different advocates at a
hearing once it was determinated that legal issues were involved, the initial hearing would have to be adjourned so that a
hearing with proper procedures might be afforded. If identical
procedural safeguards are provided at hearings on questions of
260. See 12 Minn. Code Agency Rules 2.044(A)(1) (1979), INin. DEP'T OF
PUiBLC WELFARE, AFDC PROGRAM MANUAL, I-H (1979). See also note 230 supra.
261. Federal regulations do not require that hearing officers be attorneys, although in some states attorneys comprise all or part of the hearing staff. A telephone survey of fifteen states conducted by the Congressional Research
Service found that six states require hearing officers to be attorneys. ADnmmTRATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 171-72.
262. Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (NMD. Cal.), affid mem, sub
nom. Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412 U.S. 924 (1973).
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law and of fact, this administrative delay and waste can be
avoided.
These conclusions about the appropriate procedures for
hearings on questions of law in the welfare context must be
considered tentative. The data collected from the Minnesota
experience demonstrate only that it is possible for hearing procedures designed to resolve issues of fact correctly to resolve
issues of law. It cannot be determined from this study whether
such hearing procedures would produce satisfactory results on
issues of law elsewhere. It might be, for example, that the success of the Minnesota hearings is in fact attributable to the
sense of independence possessed by the particular hearing officers, the administrative climate created by policymakers in
the state Department of Public Welfare, or the general tradition
of progressive social welfare programs in the state. A comparative study of alternative procedures for the resolution of issues
of law in the welfare context would be a fruitful objective for
263
further research.
VL

CONCLUSION

This Article reviews the developments that led to the issuance of HEW regulations authorizing states to restrict the hearing rights of welfare recipients through early discontinuation of
benefits to those raising issues solely of law. Those regulations
were neither carefully nor thoughtfully drafted. They were not
formulated to further any agency model of effective hearing
procedure, nor to respond to a comprehensive study of state
hearing practices under alternative procedures. Rather, the
sole motivating force behind this restriction of hearing rights
was an effort to grant states as much discretion in the formulation of hearing policy as the law, in HEW's view, permitted. A
survey of current state practices under the regulations reveals
that a substantial number of states have taken advantage of the
discretion given to them by HEW and have chosen to discontinue benefits prior to the decisions on appeals. An analysis of
263. It may be, for example, that improvements in the bureaucratic process
through which decisions are made to send notices of intended terminations or
reductions to recipients could result in the correction of many errors even
before the client is notified of the agency's intended action. Bureaucratic errors might also be corrected prior to hearings if the fies were screened by an
employee within the agency empowered to negotiate settlements. See generally J. HANDLER, PROTECTING THE SOCIAL SERVICE CLIENT- LEGAL AND STRUCTuRAL CoNTROLs ON OFFICIAL DIsCRETION (1979); Mashaw, The Management
Side of Due Process,supra note 187.
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the statutory validity and constitutionality of the regulations
suggests that, despite the assumptions of HEW, there are substantial questions about the statutory and constitutional validity of the regulations.
One might believe that these regulations do not deserve
the extended analysis that they receive here, that the regulations are only ephemeral and are certain to be replaced by
more carefully considered provisions when the AFDC program
becomes part of a reformed national welfare system. Unfortunately, rather than being discarded in the process of national
welfare iteform, the AFDC restrictive hearing regulation threatens to become a statutorily mandated rule. A 1978 version of
the Carter Administration's welfare reform proposal, the Better
Jobs and Income Act, would transform this regulatory policy
into statutory language governing all welfare programs. Under
that Act, the government would discontinue assistance if the
"sole issue for hearing is one of State or Federal law (or change
therein)." 264 A less comprehensive bill, which has already
passed in the House of Representatives, would provide that, in
the AFDC program, there would be no entitlement to continuation of benefits pending a hearing if "prior to the hearing, there
is a determination that the sole issue for hearing is one of State
or Federal law (or change therein) and not one of incorrect
payment computation." 2 65 Before this bill or other similar proposals become law, both Congress and the Department of
Health and Human Services should give more serious consideration to the provision of adequate hearings for welfare recipients who seek to challenge the legality of administrative
actions depriving them of vitally needed welfare benefits.

264.
265.

Better Jobs and Income Act, supra note 1, § 2144(a) (10).
Social Welfare Reform Amendments, supra note 1, § 110(b).
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APPENDIX
DEFINITIONS AND EXAMPLES OF ISSUE CATEGORIES
I.

FACT

An issue of fact is a question concerning whether a phenomenon has happened or is happening independent of or anterior to any assertion as to its legal
effect. Although the determination of the question of fact may have important
legal effects, the determination of the factual issue itself does not require either
the interpretation of a legal standard or the application of facts to a legal standard.
Examples1. Whether the man living in the home is the father of the child who is an
AFDC beneficiary.
2. Whether the father is working more than twenty hours a week.
11.

APPLICATION

An issue is an issue of application if it is resolved by applying a legal standard to the undisputed facts-of the particular case. An issue of application is
distinguished from an issue of legal definition by the necessity, in the former,
to take account of the undisputed facts of the particular case.
Examples:
1. Whether, in light of the nature of the recipient's employment and her
personal circumstances, the amount which she spends for child care is "reasonably attributable to the earning" of her income.
2. Whether, in light of the particular parent's medical condition and limited ability to care for the child, the child is "deprived of parental support or
care by reason of the. . . physical or mental incapacity of a parent."
III. LEGAL DEFINITION
An issue is an issue of legal definition if its resolution will elaborate, in
general terms, the meaning of language in a statute, regulation or constitutional
provision.

A.

INTERPRETATION

An issue is a question of interpretation if it is a question of legal definition
which does not fall within any of the subcategories B through F below.
Examples:
1. Whether sick pay received from a recipient's employer is "earned income" within the meaning of section 402(a) (8) of the Social Security Act.
2. Whether monies deducted from the recipient's paycheck in payment for
bankruptcy filing fees may be counted as "net income available for current
use" within the meaning of 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (3) (ii) (D).

B. ULTRA ViREs STATE ACTION
An issue concerns ultra vires state action if it challenges the agency's policy or regulation on the ground that such policy or regulation exceeds the
agency's authority under state law.
Examples:
1. Whether the imposition of a policy that a recipient who sells a home
may not retain the proceeds without reinvestment for more than ninety days is
invalid because the agency failed to promulgate its policy according to the
rulemaking provisions of the state administrative procedure act.
2. Whether the state may require recipients, as a condition of AFDC eligibility, to participate in a work program created by the agency without any pro-
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vision in state law giving the agency authority to establish such a program
requirement.
C.

CONFLICT wrrH STATE LAW

An issue concerns a conflict with state law when the recipient's appeal
challenges the legality of a state policy or regulation on the ground that it is in
conflict with a substantive provision of state law.
Example:
1. Whether a state policy refusing to permit registrants in the Work Incentive Program to engage in any further training if they are in any way employable is a violation of the state statute which requires that the WIN program
have the "objective of assuring, to the maximum extent possible, that the relative ... will enter the labor force, accept reasonable employment, and become
self-sufficient."
D.

CoNFLIcT WITH FEDERAL LAw

An issue concerns a conflict with federal law when the recipient's appeal
challenges the legality of a state statute, regulation or policy, or federal regulation on the ground that it is in conflict with a substantive provision of federal
law.
Example:
1. Whether a state regulation which does not permit the deduction of
child care costs paid to a grandparent is in violation of section 402(a) (7) of the
Social Security Act.

E.

CONFLICT wrrH STATE AND FEDERAL LAW

An issue concerns a conflict with state and federal law when the recipient's
appeal challenges the legality of a state statute, regulation or policy, or federal
regulation on the ground that it is in conflict with substantive provisions of
both state and federal law.
F.

UNCONSTrrITIONALrrY

An appeal raises an issue of unconstitutionality when the recipient contends that the state or federal law or policy is in conflict with some provision of
the United States Constitution.
Example:
1. Whether section 407 of the Social Security Act which limits eligibility to
families with an unemployed father and excludes families with an unemployed
mother is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection component of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
IV.

PROTEST OF POLICY

An appeal is a protest of policy when the recipient does not question the
agency's finding of facts or the definition or application of law, but rather challenges the wisdom of a policy of conceded legality.
Examples:
1. Whether the state should include within its AFDC program payments
to essential needy relatives living in the home of AFDC recipients where the
Social Security Act gives the states an option to include such a program.
2. Whether the agency should pay 100% of recipient need where the
Supreme Court has upheld the legality of HEW's permitting the states to pay a
percentage of need.
Cases may also be categorized as:
V. OPINION DOES NOT REVEAL ISSUE

